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INTRODUCTION
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.1 is a seminal case. It
marks the last time the Supreme Court performed a serious analysis of
whether a group should be denominated a suspect class, and thus receive
heightened judicial protection from discrimination. At the same time, its
application of a heightened variant of rational basis review, and its conclusion that the challenged government action was based in “irrational prejudice,” has generated three decades of academic and judicial speculation
about the conditions under which such heightened rational basis review
would or should be performed.2 Cleburne has also served as a font of the
Court’s emerging “animus” doctrine, which has been at least responsible
for, among other things, the remarkable string of victories gay-rights plaintiffs have won at the Court over the last two decades.3
And yet, important parts of this consequential case may have been accidents—that is, they may have emerged as consequences not intended by a
majority of the Justices. Examination of several Justices’ papers4 reveals
that the majority originally planned to decide only the suspect class question, and to remand the case to the lower court for application of rational
basis review. It was only late in their deliberations—and late in the 1984–
1
2

3

4

473 U.S. 432 (1985).
See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 525–26 (2004)
(stating that the three-tiered section imposes rigorous judicial standards that apply under limited
conditions); Richard B. Saphire, Equal Protection, Rational Basis Review, and the Impact of City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 88 KY. L.J. 591, 605 (arguing that a statute’s rationality cannot be evaluated without some concept of the goal that it was meant to further); Peter S.
Smith, The Demise of Three-Tier Review: Has the United States Supreme Court Adopted a “Sliding Scale” Approach Toward Equal Protection Jurisprudence?, 23 J. CONTEMP. L. 475, 477 n.14
(1997) (explaining the deferential nature of the rational basis inquiry); Neelum J. Wadhwani, Rational Reviews, Irrational Results, 84 TEX. L. REV. 801, 804 (2006) (explaining the parameters
and nature of the rational basis test); John D. Wilson, Comment, Cleburne: An Evolutionary Step
in Equal Protection Analysis, 46 MD. L. REV. 163, 185 (1986) (stating that under rational basis
review the Court will normally uphold a statute that is applied unconstitutionally if it is constitutional on its face); sources cited infra note 3.
See, e.g., WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW (2017);
Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection From Animus, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 183,
204 (labeling Cleburne as an animus precedent); Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 908 (2012) (discussing animus as stereotype and fear in
Cleburne). See also Steven Smith, The Jurisprudence of Denigration, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
675, 696–98 (2014) (recognizing but critiquing the animus idea).
This Article is based on an examination of the publicly-available papers of Justices Brennan,
White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell. Most duplicative references are supported by citations
to Justice Powell’s papers, which are the only papers of this group of Justices to have been made
available online. The papers of the other Justices are located in the Library of Congress. Citations to those other Justices’ papers are provided where appropriate.
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85 term—when Justice White, the author of Cleburne, was prevailed upon
to add the final substantive section of what became the majority opinion,
which actually performed the rational basis review it had called for, and
struck down the government’s action on that basis.
Those papers also reveal a late-erupting dispute between Justices White
and Powell over whether that rational basis analysis ought to have resulted
in a decision striking down the Cleburne ordinance on its face, or merely as
applied to the plaintiffs’ particular group home. The resolution of that dispute ostensibly in favor of the latter approach helped create the more stringent, record-based tone of the majority opinion’s rational basis analysis.
Thus, the as-applied nature of the decision—a decision Justice White defended as allowing municipalities more leeway to regulate5—helped color
the opinion’s tone in a way that has since been interpreted as imposing
stricter judicial review.
These discoveries are important in themselves.6 But they also suggest
interesting lessons about the path of the Court’s equal protection doctrine,
the nature of that doctrine, and the overall predictability—or unpredictability—of constitutional law more generally. For these reasons, it bears investigating the Court’s deliberations and thinking about what the results suggest, not just about Cleburne, and not just about equal protection, but about
constitutional law and legal doctrine more generally.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I begins the Article by briefly
recounting the Cleburne litigation. Part II then mines the Justices’ records
to recount their deliberations that led to the majority opinion we know today. Part II.A. considers the Justices’ decision to decide the rational basis
5
6

See infra text accompanying notes 150–152 and 182–186 (explaining Justice White’s concerns
with a facial strike-down).
This is not the first piece of legal scholarship to publicize the fact that the first draft of Cleburne
would have remanded the case. Professor Earl Maltz noted this in 2014. Earl M. Maltz, The
Burger Court and the Conflict Over the Rational Basis Test: The Untold Story of Massachusetts
Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 39 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 264, 282 (2014). Professor Maltz focused on
the Justices’ deliberations in Cleburne as the culmination of their discussion of the meaning of
rational basis review. That discussion—and Professor Maltz’s focus—centers on earlier cases.
This Article focuses more intensively on Cleburne, in which the Justices’ views about rationality
review provided an important backdrop, see infra Part II.A.2., but were not front and center.
Other scholars have cited small portions of the Justices’ Cleburne papers as part of their examinations of other, related, issues. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM: THE
BURGER COURT IN ACTION 251 (1990) (quoting Justice Powell’s view about tiered scrutiny in
the context of the Court’s consideration of Cleburne); William N. Eskridge, Some Effects of
Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 2062, 2262–64 (2002); Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 246 n.152 (1991) (quoting Schwartz); Mark V. Tushnet, The Supreme Court and Race Discrimination, 1967–1991: The View From the Marshall Papers, 36
WM. & MARY L. REV. 473, 536–37 (1995) (citing Justice Powell’s objection to Justice White’s
definition of the two-tier structure in Cleburne). None of these discussions focuses intensively
on the deliberations in Cleburne itself.
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issue, rather than remand the case to the lower court to do so. It focuses in
particular on the role of Justice William Rehnquist. Justice Rehnquist insisted that the Court decide the suspect class question Cleburne posed, in
favor of finding that discrimination against the intellectually disabled merited only rational basis scrutiny. But he was much more accommodating of
Justice Powell’s desire to have the Court decide the ensuing rational basis
question itself, rather than remand the case. That combination of preferences, for which he found support in Justice O’Connor and Justice White
himself, paved the way for White to accommodate Justice Powell’s preference. That dynamic, in turn, created the oddly-sequenced majority opinion,
criticized by Justice Marshall in his partial dissent, in which the Court began by rejecting the plaintiffs’ suspect class argument but then continued
on to hold that the challenged action violated the lower, default, rational
basis standard.
Part II.B. turns to the Justices’ deliberations on the facial/as-applied
dispute. It reveals that, in contrast to his accommodating stance on the remand issue, Justice White held fast in his insistence on deciding the case on
as-applied grounds, rather than striking the ordinance down on its face, as
Justice Powell preferred. Part II.B. then examines White’s rational basis
analysis. It concludes that that analysis rested uncomfortably on the asapplied ground on which he successfully insisted. While he squarely posed
the issue in terms of the particular permit denial issued to the particular
group home in question, much of his analysis did not focus on those particularities, but instead rested on the rationality vel non of the city’s discrimination against the intellectually disabled as a broad category of persons.
Part III reconsiders the oddities and tensions revealed as the results of
the intra-Court dynamics recounted in Part II, to determine whether they
allow us to draw broader conclusions about the Court and its doctrine. Part
III.A. reconsiders Cleburne’s sequencing. It suggests that Cleburne may
reflect a dynamic related to public choice theory, in which the Court’s multi-member nature creates the possibility of logrolling, and results in the
Court adopting an approach—here, the odd sequencing of its suspect class
and rational basis analysis—that is both internally inconsistent and not fully reflective of the views of a majority of the Justices.
Part III.B. reconsiders the facial/as-applied issue. It begins by speculating that Justice White’s firmness on this issue might have derived from the
fact that, at that point in the 1984–85 term, he was also drafting the Court’s
opinion in Brockett v. Spokane Arcades,7 a First Amendment case where he
was defending the appropriateness of an as-applied, rather than facial,
strike-down of a law alleged to violate the First Amendment. If White’s
7

472 U.S. 491 (1985).
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concern for consistency between his opinions in these two contemporaneous cases does indeed help explain his views on the facial/as-applied issue,
then it suggests that the broader content of the Court’s (and, indeed, a particular Justice’s) agenda may influence that Justice’s choices in particular
cases.
This Part also suggests that White was motivated by his desire to allow
municipalities leeway to regulate living situations for the intellectually disabled when the would-be residents were more profoundly disabled than the
persons at issue in Cleburne.8 If this latter explanation provides all or part
of the reason for White’s position, then, ironically, his attempt to perform
an as-applied analysis, which almost necessarily implies recourse to the
record, had the unintended effect of making his analysis appear to be an
unusually stringent application of judicial review—the “rational basis with
bite” that has come to be associated with Cleburne. In other words, that
unusually stringent rational basis scrutiny may have been an artifact of his
choice on the facial/as-applied issue—which itself may have derived from
a desire to allow government more leeway to regulate.
Part IV widens the lens even more broadly. As Part IV notes, the story
Cleburne tells is a straightforward one: the Court began by considering
whether a group merits heightened judicial protection; concluded, essentially, that the group came close but didn’t quite satisfy the requisites for that
protection; but then, armed with the evidence from that near-miss, proceeded to apply a more stringent version of rational basis scrutiny that yielded a
win for that group.
The problem is that the Justices’ papers reveal that this is not what happened. Yet, we are left with a text—the opinion—that tells exactly that
compelling (but incorrect) story. Part IV concludes the Article by reflecting on this oddity. Given that what matters is the text of an opinion (rather
than the deliberations that led to it), the example of Cleburne suggests that
constitutional law doctrine—and, indeed, perhaps all legal doctrine—is
more random than we might realize. Particularized “accidents,” such as
those recounted in Parts II and III, may influence particular parts of opinions. But when those components are combined into a text, the creation
process of which (the Justices’ deliberations) is not easily available, and, at
any rate, is not considered a valid interpretive aid,9 the result may be a
compelling, but misleading story. Yet that story may influence both lawyers and lay consumers of the Court’s work-product in ways unintended by
the Justices. Such a story may especially influence those who teach the
8

9

This second explanation, which appears well-supported in the Justices’ papers, is not inconsistent
with the first explanation—that is, both may have played a role in convincing Justice White to
stand firm on this issue.
See infra note 224.

626

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19:3

case, who may feel a special temptation or obligation to create coherentsounding narratives of constitutional doctrine for their students. This latter
phenomenon may be especially pernicious, as the repetition of a compelling but inaccurate story eventually solidifies into an accepted, but inaccurate, truth.
I. CLEBURNE
Today, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Cleburne is recognized as a watershed. It marked the last time the Court performed a serious analysis of
whether a group should be considered a suspect class. The Court’s identification of serious judicial competence-based issues with so denominating
the intellectually disabled, and its rejection of that status for that group,
presaged the Court’s de facto abandonment of that approach to equal protection, even if that tradition continued on in lower federal courts and in
state courts interpreting state constitutions’ equality provisions.10
At the same time, its decision that the plaintiffs in that case were the
victims of “irrational prejudice”11 had significant generative force. In the
immediate aftermath of Cleburne, lower courts engaged in a spate of
heightened scrutiny of discrimination claims under the rational basis standard.12 Eventually, the Supreme Court picked up on the related ideas of
heightened rational basis review and animus, employing such ideas in the
gay rights cases beginning with Romer v. Evans13 and extending at least to
United States v. Windsor14 and arguably to Obergefell v. Hodges.15 More
10

11
12

13

14
15

See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 481 (9th Cir. 2014) (concluding that sexual orientation discrimination requires “heightened scrutiny”); Varnum v. Brien,
763 N.W.2d 862, 896 (Iowa 2009) (concluding that “legislative classifications based on sexual
orientation must be examined under a heightened level of scrutiny under the Iowa Constitution”).
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).
See, e.g., Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1166 n.5 (9th Cir. 1991) (describing an earlier case,
High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990), as employing
“active rational basis” based on Cleburne); Knutzen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Hous. Ctr., 815 F.2d
1343, 1354–55 (10th Cir. 1987) (applying what the court called the “second order rational basis
review” from Cleburne to handicapped persons denied admission to a federally funded housing
project); Buttino v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 801 F.Supp. 298, 308 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (applying “active heightened scrutiny” on the authority of Pruitt); Dubbs v. Cent. Intelligence Agency,
769 F.Supp. 1113, 1117 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (describing the heightened rational basis utilized in
High Tech Gays); Coburn v. Agustin, 627 F.Supp. 983, 988–97 (D. Kan. 1985) (applying what it
called “second order rational basis review” from Cleburne and other cases to strike down a medical malpractice statute).
517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that a Colorado referendum preventing municipalities from protecting people from discrimination due to sexual orientation violated the Equal Protection
Clause).
133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013) (invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act).
135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015) (establishing a right to same-sex marriage pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment). See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579–80 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concur-
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generally, the work of lower courts and the Supreme Court itself in building upon Cleburne has raised the prospect of a new type of equal protection
review, one that is more granular, rather than focused on across-the-board
heightened scrutiny for a particular type of discrimination.16 Finally,
Cleburne gave new force to the idea, first broached a dozen years before in
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,17 that “a bare . . . desire to harm a
politically powerless minority”18 could not constitute a legitimate government interest. Indeed, Cleburne (with an assist from Moreno) can be understood as the font of what scholars now call the “animus” doctrine.19
Thus, Cleburne was important, both in its turn away from suspect class
analysis and its suggestion of a new way forward for equal protection law.
As such, its analysis—and how the Court arrived at that analysis—bears
consideration.
A. The Background
The Cleburne litigation had its origins in July, 1980, when Jan Hannah
purchased the home at 201 Featherston Street in Cleburne, Texas, a small
community near Fort Worth, for use as a group home for approximately
thirteen adults who suffered from mild or moderate intellectual disability.20
Hannah was soon informed that the town’s zoning ordinance required that
the facility, as a “hospital for the . . . feeble minded,” required a special use
permit.21 Moreover, a different provision of the town’s zoning ordinance

16

17
18
19

20
21

ring in the judgment) (employing heightened rational basis scrutiny to vote to strike town Texas’s same-sex sodomy law).
See, e.g., WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ENFORCING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE: CONGRESSIONAL
POWER, JUDICIAL DOCTRINE, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 74–76 (2015) (discussing the Court’s
modern sex discrimination jurisprudence as a more granular inquiry than the same across-theboard heightened scrutiny of each and every sex classification); William D. Araiza, After the Tiers: Windsor, Congressional Authority to Enforce Equal Protection, and the Challenge of Pointillist Constitutionalism, 94 B.U. L. REV. 367, 394 (2014) (considering the implications of the
Court’s similar granular scrutiny of sexual orientation discrimination for Congress’s power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause).
413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
Id.
See Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2693 (2013); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment); Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (1996) (all citing Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973), and discussing the concept of animus); see also Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. 2584. Obergefell
is a tougher case to slot within the animus doctrine; nevertheless, at the very least the Court’s
reasoning in that case was grounded on principles that could be gleaned from the earlier animus
cases. See, e.g., ARAIZA, supra note 3, at Chapter 12. For scholarly discussions of animus, see
sources cited supra note 3.
The judicial decisions and contemporary documents describe this condition as “mental retardation.” That terminology is retained only in direct quotations from those documents.
Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, No. CA 3-80-1576-F, at ¶¶ 13, 15 (N.D. Tex. Apr.
16, 1982).
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prohibited such a “hospital” in an area, like the one in which the Featherston property was located, which was zoned R-3. The town zoning commission denied the special use permit in August of that year. Two months
later, the city council reaffirmed that denial.22
After the city council’s action, Hannah, the entity she created to operate
the home, an association comprised of and advocating for intellectually
disabled persons, and other plaintiffs sued, alleging a variety of statutory
and constitutional violations.23 Most relevantly for our purposes, the plaintiffs alleged that the city’s actions violated the equal protection rights of the
would-be residents. The district court rejected that claim.24 It acknowledged that courts disagreed on whether intellectually disabled persons constituted a suspect or quasi-suspect class, but the court concluded that they
were not. Thus, it upheld the city’s actions, even though that court found
that among the factors the city council “considered” in its decision to deny
the permit were both “the attitude of a majority of owners of property located within two hundred . . . feet” of the home and “concern for the fears
of elderly residents of the neighborhood.”25 It concluded that “[t]he location of the group home raises many legitimate concerns with the city and its
residents,” and that, “[s]ubjected to [the] limited standard of review” required by the rational basis standard, “the zoning ordinance as written and
as applied to Plaintiffs[] is rationally related to legitimate purposes and interests of the City of Cleburne.”26
The Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision on the equal protection issue.27 It concluded that the intellectually disabled satisfied the criteria for heightened scrutiny, even if the conceded appropriateness of some
differential treatment of that group rendered it only a quasi-suspect, rather
than a fully suspect, class. Applying that heightened scrutiny, the court
held that the ordinance at issue was facially unconstitutional, and that the
city council’s denial of the special use permit was also unconstitutional.
The court dismissed as illegitimate several of the city’s justifications both
for the ordinance and its denial of the particular permit for the Featherston
home. It acknowledged the legitimacy of other justifications it proffered,
such as the prevention of both traffic congestion and fire hazards; however,

22

23
24
25
26
27

For details about those actions, see Dan Bodine, Proposed Retardation Facility Draws Fire,
CLEBURNE TIMES-REVIEW, Aug. 19, 1980, at 1; Dan Bodine, Halfway House Filing Suit on Decision, CLEBURNE TIMES-REVIEW, Oct. 15, 1980, at 1.
See Cleburne Living Ctr. v. City of Cleburne, No. CA3-30-1576-F (N.D. Tex., Dallas Div.
1982), at 1–2 (identifying the plaintiffs).
Id.
Id. at 9–10.
Id. at 19–20.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 195–202 (5th Cir. 1984).
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it found that neither the ordinance nor the council’s permit denial were sufficiently related to those latter interests.
B. At the Supreme Court
The Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit, but on a different ground. Writing
for six Justices, Justice White began by considering, and rejecting, the lower court’s conclusion that the intellectually disabled constituted a quasisuspect class. His analysis consisted of an uneasy mixture of direct conclusions about the relevant differences distinguishing the intellectually disabled from mainstream society and standard political process reasoning. For
example, he began his analysis by observing that the intellectually disabled
“are . . . different, immutably so, in relevant respects,” from mainstream
society.28 But he also noted that legislatures had enacted a variety of legislation benefitting that group, and thus concluded that the democratic process was in fact responsive to their needs.29
Justice White concluded his suspect class analysis by a near-explicit
confession of judicial inability to manage suspect class analysis if the Court
granted the intellectually disabled suspect class status. He observed that
other groups—“the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm”30—
might, along with the intellectually disabled, share some characteristics of
suspectness. But exactly because those characteristics were relatively
widely shared, he concluded that the Court should not grant that status to
the plaintiffs, given the impossibility of justifying a decision to grant suspect class status to the intellectually disabled while denying it to those other groups.31
Despite that preliminary defeat, the plaintiffs nevertheless prevailed in
the case. When the Court proceeded to scrutinize the city’s actions under
the rational basis standard, it concluded that they failed that scrutiny.32 As
it had before the lower courts, the city offered several legitimate-sounding
reasons for its decision, including concerns about flood evacuation, residential density, traffic congestion, and legal liability for the actions of the
would-be residents. The Court rejected those reasons, on the grounds that
they did not justify the permit requirement for the group home in question
while dispensing with that requirement for other land uses in that area, including hospitals, convalescent homes, and fraternity houses.33 Notably,

28
29
30
31
32
33

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985).
Id. at 443–44.
Id. at 445–46.
Id.
Id. at 447-50.
Id.
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the Court based its conclusion about the ordinance’s poor fit with those
concerns on a review of the record—a deviation from the normal rule that
record-based justification is unnecessary in rational basis cases.34
Another aspect of the Court’s approach also merits mention. The Court
began its rational basis scrutiny by stating that “the [City] Council was
concerned with the negative attitude of the majority of property owners located within 200 feet of the [proposed] facility, as well as with the fears of
elderly residents of the neighborhood.”35 The Court made short work of
these (and similar36) sentiments, observing that “mere negative attitudes, or
fear” were not “permissible bases” for the city’s differential treatment of
the group home from “apartment houses, multiple dwellings, and the
like.”37 It is at least arguable that the Court’s identification of these (illegitimate) negative attitudes at the outset of its analysis set the stage for its
closer-than-normal scrutiny of the city’s more legitimate justifications for
its decision. Indeed, Justice White implicitly pointed back to those illegitimate grounds at the end of his opinion, when he concluded that “[t]he
short of it is that requiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an
irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded.”38
Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger, joined the majority but
also wrote a separate concurrence to express his continued disagreement
with the entire enterprise of suspect class/tiered scrutiny analysis.39 Despite that disagreement, he joined Justice White’s opinion,40 concluding
that “[t]he record convinces me that this permit was required because of the
irrational fears of neighboring property owners, rather than for the protection of the mentally retarded persons who would reside in [the proposed]
home.”41
Justice Marshall, writing for himself and Justices Brennan and
Blackmun, concurred in the judgment only.42 Most of his opinion was de-

34
35
36

37
38
39
40

41
42

See infra note 140 (citing cases applying the traditional, deferential version of rational basis review).
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448.
In the next paragraph, after rejecting the justifications discussed in the text, the Court rejected, on
similar grounds, the argument that the proposed group home was located across the street from a
junior high school. See id. at 449.
Id. at 448.
Id. at 450.
Id. at 451 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Chief Justice Burger never appears to have formally joined Justice White’s opinion, but it appears that his decision to join Justice Stevens’ opinion, which itself joined the majority, sufficed
to have him counted as having joined the majority. See id. at 433 (noting Chief Justice Burger as
having joined the majority). See also infra note 186 (clerk’s record of correspondence in the
case, not noting any join letter from Burger).
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 455 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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voted to arguing that the intellectually disabled did in fact constitute a suspect class for which heightened scrutiny was appropriate.43 For our purposes, however, what is most relevant about his opinion was his criticism
of the Court’s decision to decide the suspect class question when it would
eventually conclude that the city’s actions failed the default, rational basis,
standard. He described the majority’s methodology as a “‘two for the price
of one’ approach to constitutional decisionmaking” that violated the
Court’s normal practice of deciding only the issues necessary to resolve the
case in front of it.44
II. THE JUSTICES’ DELIBERATIONS
The records of several Justices reveal two aspects of the Court’s analysis in Cleburne that suggest that its unusually stringent rational basis scrutiny arose either as an afterthought or a collateral consequence of its resolution of a different issue—phenomena this Article shorthands as “acci“accidents.” First, the Court originally planned on remanding the case for
the lower court to apply rational basis scrutiny, rather than applying it itself
and deciding the case, as it eventually did. While there had always been
support on the Court for deciding rather than remanding the case,45 through
the post-oral argument and initial opinion drafting phases that was a distinctly minority position, which a majority eventually accepted without
recognizing the significance of that choice. Second, the more muscular
tinge to that rational basis scrutiny seems to have flowed in part from Justice White’s insistence on deciding the case on an as-applied, rather than a
facial basis—a decision that in turn was motivated by a desire to give municipalities more, not less, leeway to regulate group homes for the intellectually disabled.
These revelations are interesting in themselves. But the fact that that
unusually stringent scrutiny became Cleburne’s defining characteristic—
indeed, a characteristic that subsequently became quite influential46—
makes them all the more important. More generally, these revelations raise

43

44
45
46

While Justice Marshall did not specify whether he would have denominated the intellectually
disabled a full-blown suspect class or a quasi-suspect class, his statement of the scrutiny he believed appropriate in this case—that the action “substantially further[] legitimate and important
purposes,”—suggests intermediate review. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 460 (Marshall, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). It should be noted, however, that he reached that conclusion based
not just on the character of the group suffering the discrimination, but also on the nature of the
right at issue—here, the right to establish a home.
Id. at 456 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See text accompanying infra notes 52, 104, & 106.
See supra note 12; see also supra note 3 (citing sources noting Cleburne’s relevance to the
Court’s animus doctrine).
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interesting and important questions about the nature of constitutional law
decision-making, and the path of constitutional law doctrine.
A. The Remand Question
1. The May 29 Draft
Records of the Justices reveal that the analysis in Justice White’s original draft opinion in Cleburne essentially concluded with the Court’s rejection of suspect class status for the intellectually disabled.47 That draft
would have then remanded the case to the lower court for application of rational basis scrutiny. His draft opinion, circulated to the conference on
May 29, considered and rejected the plaintiffs’ argument for heightened
scrutiny in Part III. It then moved on to a short concluding section (Part
IV) that first cautioned that “[o]ur refusal to recognize the retarded as a
quasi-suspect class does not leave them entirely unprotected from invidious
discrimination,” and reminded readers that the rational basis standard both
prohibited “arbitrary [and] irrational” distinctions and ruled out “some objectives—such as ‘a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular
group’—” as “legitimate state interests.”48
Second, that final section of the draft explained why it was appropriate
for the Court to have the Court of Appeals apply the rational basis standard
in the first instance. In support of that tentative decision, the draft noted
that that lower court had not yet had an opportunity to apply that standard,
since it had settled on intermediate scrutiny as the proper standard of review.49 The draft also observed that the State of Texas had submitted an
amicus brief to the Court, arguing both that the city’s permit denial violated
state mental health law, and that the city lacked the authority to make zoning decisions based on the capacity of intellectually disabled persons to live
in a group home.50 The draft concluded that this “‘ambiguity in state law’”
“‘cloud[ed]’” the issue sufficiently to warrant giving the lower court the
opportunity to address these questions, which had not been raised before
that court.51

47

48
49
50

51

See, e.g., Papers of J. Lewis Powell in No. 84-468, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
http://law2.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1581 [hereinafter Powell Papers] (including Justice White’s May 29 draft).
Powell Papers, supra note 47, First Draft 12-13 (May 29, 1985) [hereinafter May 29 Draft]
(quoting Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
Id. at 13.
Id. at 13 n.14.
Id. at 13.
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2. Antecedents Of The Remand Decision
The May 29 draft’s decision to remand the case to the Fifth Circuit did
not appear out of the blue. Both Justice Powell’s and Justice Blackmun’s
post-oral argument conference notes reveal majority support on the Court
for that decision. Both Justices’ notes indicate that Chief Justice Burger
and Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor supported a reversal
of the Fifth Circuit’s suspect class decision and a remand to that court to
apply the rational basis test.52
Thus, the draft’s remand decision seemed to enjoy the initial support of
a five-Justice majority. Of the remaining four Justices, three—Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun—would have affirmed the lower court’s conclusion that the intellectually disabled merited explicitly heightened scrutiny.
The final Justice—Stevens—supported a decision affirming the lower
court’s result on a rational basis ground; however, according to Justice
Powell’s notes, he also believed that the ordinance would “clearly” be invalid if it was subjected to heightened scrutiny.53
a. The Crisis of Suspect Class Analysis
The support for the remand option should not be surprising, even if it
would have mooted the heightened rational basis review for which
Cleburne is known today. As explained below,54 the Justices in Cleburne
52

53
54

See Papers of J. Harry A. Blackmun in No. 84-468 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center
(on file with the Library of Congress, Box 428, Folder 1) [hereinafter Blackmun Papers] (reflecting these fives justices’ preferences from the Court’s April 26 conference, and including the notation “5=RR”); Powell Papers, supra note 43, Conference Notes (Mar. 20, 1985) (reflecting these five justices’ preferences from the Court’s March 20 conference). Based on examination of
his papers, “RR” appears to have been Justice Blackmun’s shorthand for “reverse and remand.”
Justice Powell’s notes, in addition to reflecting a preference for a remand, also indicate that he
could also have supported the Court itself affirming the result on a rational basis ground; Justice
Blackmun’s notes indicate the same openness on the part of Justice O’Connor. See Powell Papers, supra note 43, Conference Notes (Mar. 20, 1985); Blackmun Papers, supra.
In addition to this evidence, at oral argument the attorney for group home was asked why it
didn’t make sense to remand the case, with another justice expressing agreement with that idea.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Cleburne v, 473 U.S. 432 (No. 84-468), 1985 U.S. Trans.
LEXIS 54; id. at 41-42; Transcript of Oral Argument at 25, Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432 (No. 84468), 1985 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 93; id. at 27. Justice Powell’s notes indicate that that questioner
was Justice White, and that it was Justice Rehnquist who agreed with that suggestion. See Powell Papers, supra note 47. It should be noted that the case was argued twice apparently because
of an illness that kept Justice Powell off the bench for the first oral argument. See Eskridge, supra note 6, at 2263; see also E-mail from Renea Hicks, attorney for Cleburne plaintiffs, to author
(Mar. 8, 2016) (on file with author). In light of the 4-4 split that seemed likely after the March
argument, it is not surprising that the Court scheduled reargument in the case.
Powell Papers, supra note 47, Conference Notes 2 (Mar. 20, 1985) (reflecting Justice Stevens’s
belief that the ordinance would “clearly” be invalid).
See infra Parts II.A.3. and III.A.
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were far more focused on the suspect class question that case posed, and
less interested in the proper outcome of any rational basis review of the
city’s actions. Indeed, with the benefit of hindsight, we can see that
Cleburne came at a crisis point of suspect class analysis. After a decade of
experimentation, a variety of difficulties with suspect class analysis had become manifest by the mid-1980s. Some of those problems were acknowledged at the start of this period. For example, in Frontiero v. Richardson,55
an early exemplar of suspect class analysis, Justice Brennan, seeking to explain why some classifications that otherwise satisfied his criteria for suspectness should not be granted that status, argued that suspect classifications, in addition to their other characteristics, also “frequently bear[] no
relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.”56 Of course, as
commentators have recognized, such an overt recourse to the relevance of
the classification to a legitimate government interest contradicted the promised value neutrality and process orientation of suspect class analysis.57
Such recourse to the substantive reasonableness of the classification—
and thus vulnerability to claims of Lochner-izing58 equal protection law59—
also arose in the context of distinguishing between suspect classes and suspect classifications, and, by extension, in determining what conduct constituted discrimination against whom. For example, in Craig v. Boren, the
Court struck down an Oklahoma law barring the sale of low-alcohol beer to
young males but allowing such sale to females of the same age.60 In dissent, Justice Rehnquist wondered, among other things, why the Court was
solicitous of discrimination against males, given their presumed lack of
suspect class status according to the standard political process-based criteria.61 The Court’s response, intimated only in a footnote, was that such
seemingly favorable treatment of females reflected demeaning and opportunity-limiting stereotypes about female fragility and meekness.62

55
56

57

58
59

60
61
62

411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 686. Justice Brennan identified “intelligence” and “physical disability” as examples of
classifications that were in fact relevant in the way he explained, and thus did not merit suspect
class status. Id.
See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Reistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L.
REV. 747, 787 (1991) (using similar terminology); id. at 787 n.171 (citing other scholars’ similar
arguments).
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
See, e.g., Maltz, supra note 6, at 268 (quoting a draft concurring opinion by Justice Rehnquist in
Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), in which he referred to “the history of
this Court’s half century of adjudication ending in 1940” as a caution against overly-careful rational basis review).
429 U.S. 190 (1976).
Id. at 219 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 202 n.14 (majority opinion).
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Craig did not constitute the first instance of the Court having to determine what exactly constituted sex discrimination, or, more precisely, discrimination against women. In particular, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s sex
equality campaign for the ACLU in the 1970s often selected male plaintiffs, in order to press the point that sexual stereotyping injured both men
and women, and that, as in Craig, the sex discrimination the Court should
care about often ostensibly benefitted women.63 For our purposes, the important point is that the stereotyping argument forced Justices to go beyond
straightforward application of value-neutral political process reasoning, and
make substantive judgments about which types of differential treatment
constituted invidious (or at least potentially invidious) discrimination.
Other problems with suspect class analysis also manifested during this
period. In 1978, in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,64 Justice Powell forcefully rejected the applicability of Carolene Products-style
political process analysis to the question of the degree of scrutiny appropriate for race-based affirmative action programs.65 While he was only one
Justice, four of his colleagues were perceived to have been even more hostile to affirmative action than he was; thus, his rejection of a political process rationale for less-than-strict scrutiny did not bode well for the migration of such analysis into the area of race.66 A decade later, the Court
firmly rejected such analysis, without giving it particularly serious consideration.67 The Court’s rejection of political process reasoning in race cases—the context where Justice Stone likely intended it to primarily apply,
and that constituted the most pressing concern of equal protection in the
middle decades of the twentieth century—quite likely helped blunt the

63
64
65

66

67

See, e.g., Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination
Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 84–88 (2010).
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Id. at 290–99 (opinion of Powell, J.); see also Klarman, supra note 6, at 310–11 (noting the tension in affirmative action jurisprudence between the political process model of equal protection
and the model that deems any government use of certain characteristics presumptively unconstitutional regardless of how political process theory would treat it).
It is true that Justice Stevens, one of the members of this more hostile bloc in Bakke, eventually
grew more accommodating to affirmative action. See, e.g., Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 242–
45 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing for more latitude for race-based affirmative action
policies, and explicitly distinguishing such policies, in terms of their invidiousness, from Jim
Crow legislation). Nevertheless, during his early years on the Court he appeared far less accepting of government uses of race. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 534 n.5 (1980)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that racial definitions for purposes of affirmative action setasides might parallel those found in the Nazi race laws).
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co. 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). This part of Croson was a plurality, gaining the assent only of four Justices. Id. at 476, 493. Justice Scalia’s concurrence,
however, rejected the constitutionality of such plans with even more force, and thus by necessary
implication rejected a political process rationale for less than strict scrutiny. Id. at 520 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
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momentum toward its further expansion. When combined with Justice
Brennan’s failure in Frontiero to find a fifth vote for a political-process rationale for according heightened scrutiny to sex classifications, the Bakke
majority’s rejection of an analogous rationale in the context of race surely
did not bode well for that approach to equal protection.
Finally, political process analysis was plagued by a more prosaic, but
still important, problem: the difficulty of actually applying the history of
discrimination, immutability/irrelevance, and current political powerlessness criteria Justice Brennan had set forth in Frontiero.68 As noted earlier,69 even in Frontiero itself Justice Brennan was forced to acknowledge
that immutability was not a foolproof criterion for suspect class status, given the reality that many immutable criteria were in fact quite reasonable
classification tools.70 Other cases also indicated that Brennan’s approach
suffered from similar complexities. For example, in Mathews v. Lucas,71
the Court was forced to acknowledge, in the context of legitimacy discrimination, the necessarily-nuanced answers to the questions Justice Brennan’s
criteria posed. In Mathews, the Court conceded that legitimacy (the status
of being born out of wedlock) was an immutable condition that was irrelevant to persons’ abilities to contribute to society.72 Nevertheless, it concluded that children born out of wedlock did not merit “extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process,” in part because
“discrimination against illegitimates has never approached the severity or
pervasiveness of the historic legal and political discrimination against
women and Negroes.”73 Such a statement suggested at least the possibility
of a multi-tiered, and perhaps even a sliding scale approach to the level of
scrutiny appropriate for a given type of classification, with all the uncertainty attending such methodologies.74
68
69
70

71
72
73
74

See Fronteiro v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–88 (1973) (Brennan, J., concurring) (setting
forth these criteria).
See supra text accompanying note 56.
In addition, the argument that immutability is not, in most cases, a physical law of nature, but
potentially socially constructed, eventually arose in the academic commentary about equal protection. See, e.g., Samuel A. Marcosson, Constructive Immutability, 3 U. PA. J. CON. LAW 646
(2001) (proposing a theory by which the immutability prong of suspect class analysis should be
understood as referring to socially-constructed notions of which traits are immutable).
427 U.S. 495 (1976).
Id. at 505.
Id. at 506 (internal quotations omitted from first quotation).
To be sure, Mathews itself declined to adopt or apply a multi-tiered approach to equal protection.
Rather, the Court’s ambivalence about rational basis review in the 1970s, see infra text accompanying notes 80–87, allowed it to insist that even such low-level review required a non-trivial
showing from of the government. See Mathews, 427 U.S. at 505 (citing cases where the level of
scrutiny applicable in Mathews nevertheless resulted in the rejection of arbitrary classifications);
id. at 510 (stating that such scrutiny is not “toothless”); but see id. (insisting that the challenger
bore the burden of demonsrating the “insubstantiality” of the relationship between the challenged
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Justice Rehnquist, the decade’s most vocal opponent of expanding the
list of suspect classifications, made similar points, but more caustically. He
protested, in the context of the Court’s consideration of alienage classifications, that it didn’t take enormous ingenuity to craft arguments for suspect
status for a large variety of classifications.75 Relatedly, in his Craig dissent
he criticized the components of intermediate scrutiny as “so diaphanous
and elastic as to invite subjective judicial preferences or prejudices relating
to particular types of legislation.”76 His critique further highlighted the
malleability and vagueness of both Justice Brennan’s criteria and the multitiered scrutiny structure it generated.
This is not to say that suspect class doctrine was a dead letter at the
Court by 1985. Certainly, the Court’s liberals remained interested in considering expanding the list of suspect classes. Beyond Cleburne itself, this
willingness is reflected in Justice Brennan’s dissent from the denial of cert.
in Rowland v. Mad River Local School District.77 Rowland dealt with a
school district’s discrimination against a bisexual teacher. Only a month
before the Court’s first argument in Cleburne, Justice Brennan, joined by
Justice Marshall, dissented from that cert. denial, criticizing the Court for
refusing to consider whether sexual orientation should be a suspect class.
Making no secret of his view on that question, he also provided a skeletal
political process-based argument in favor of suspect class status.78
Thus, the conceptual difficulties with suspect class analysis had become
sufficiently clear by 1985 that it was perhaps unsurprising that the
Cleburne majority saw its main task as cutting off further expansion of the
list of suspect classifications. At the same time, as implied by Justice
Brennan’s cert. denial dissent in Rowland, enough sentiment for further expansion remained that, again, the majority might have viewed the main
question in Cleburne to be the fate of suspect class analysis. Indeed, both
times the Court met to discuss Cleburne, Brennan and Marshall, now

75

76
77
78

classification and a legitimate government interest). Nevertheless, Mathews was eventually cited
as support for the proposition that legitimacy classifications merited an intermediate position in
the Court’s eventual three-tiered scrutiny structure. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 657 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In addition to being
caustic, his critique was prescient, given that Justice White’s final explanation in Cleburne for
denying heightened scrutiny to the intellectually disabled reflected similar concerns about the
lack of principled limits to decisions to denominate groups as suspect or quasi-suspect. See supra text accompanying notes 30–31.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 221 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
470 U.S. 1009 (1985).
Id. at 1014 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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joined by Justice Blackmun, spoke in favor of according heightened scrutiny to the city’s actions.79
b. The Struggle Over Rational Basis Review
But the fate of suspect class analysis was not the only question that
might have been on the Justices’ minds as they considered Cleburne. A
separate, but related, issue confronting them in 1985 was the fate of rational basis review. Cleburne arose in the aftermath of an almost two decadelong debate among the Justices about such review.80 By the late 1960s the
Court had begun striking down laws as violating equal protection without
explicitly disturbing the ostensible doctrinal structure under which all classifications other than racial ones received the same, minimal judicial scrutiny. Beginning with legitimacy classification in a pair of 1968 cases,81 and
then continuing with sex classifications beginning in 1971,82 the Court had
begun to deviate from that rigid two-tiered model of equal protection. This
evolution was noticed by legal scholars, most notably Gerald Gunther, who
discussed it in his influential Harvard Law Review Foreword in 1972.83 In
turn, Gunther’s analysis (and praise) of this development was noted by individual Justices, who relied on his analysis as support for attempting to
further extend the scope of this more muscular rationality review.84
By the mid to late 1970s, the Justices’ discussions had progressed to the
point where they were openly debating the appropriate sharpness of rational basis scrutiny. For example, in 1976, in Craig v. Boren, Justice Powell
explicitly suggested that “the relatively deferential ‘rational basis’ standard
of review normally applied takes on a sharper focus when we address a
gender-based classification.”85 Justice Powell was responding to a majority
opinion that he understood as likely to be read as adopting an intermediate
level of scrutiny for the type of classification at issue (those based on sex).

79

80

81
82
83
84
85

See Powell Papers, supra note 47; see also Blackmun Papers, supra note 52 (making, in his notes
of the March 20 conference, the notation “3 HS +”). Examination of his papers suggests that
“HS” was his shorthand for “heightened scrutiny,” and “+” his shorthand for affirmance.
For a more detailed exposition of this debate, see generally Katie R. Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads and the Canon of Rational Basis Review, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 527 (2014); Maltz, supra
note 6.
Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968).
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
See Eyer, supra note 80, at 550–51 (citing Justice Powell’s attempt in his abortive opinion in
Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), to rely heavily on Gunther’s analysis).
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.* (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (addressing gender-based
classification).
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Justice Powell’s approach was not necessarily a matter of opposition to explicit recognition that sex discrimination required more heightened scrutiny. Instead, as Professors Earl Maltz and Katie Eyer have each recently recounted, Justices Powell and Brennan worked over the course of several
years in the mid-to-late 70s to convince the Court to adopt an approach to
rational basis scrutiny that was more stringent than the toothless review that
had come to prevail during the Warren Court’s reaction to the perceived
excesses of the Lochner era.86 That effort covered not just cases involving
allegedly-suspect classes; rather, both justices made clear that they were
advocating for a tougher understanding of rational basis review even in
contexts involving garden-variety social and economic regulation.87
Leading the opposition to this effort was Justice Rehnquist, who consistently insisted on keeping equal protection rational basis review exceptionally deferential.88 Indeed, as Katie Eyer has persuasively argued, that
imperative influenced him strongly enough to prompt him to characterize
the Court’s review in Craig as a new, intermediate, level of scrutiny. According to Eyer, Rehnquist’s goal in making that move—counter-intuitive
as it might seem for someone who opposed extending heightened scrutiny
to new groups89—was to immunize rational basis review from the more
muscular scrutiny in Craig, by describing Craig as introducing an entirely
new level of equal protection scrutiny, one limited to a circumscribed category of cases.90
Eventually, Justice Rehnquist triumphed, with the Court by and large
continuing to embrace a very deferential understanding of garden-variety
equal protection rationality review.91 But while Justices Powell and Bren86

87

88

89

90
91

See generally Maltz, supra note 6 (describing Justice Brennan and Justice Powell’s efforts to
develop a stricter form of rational basis review); see also Eyer, supra note 80, at 549–551 (noting
Justice Powell’s attempt in Murgia to set forth a more rigorous approach to rational basis review
as a general matter).
See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 239–47 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) (applying a more
discerning form of rational basis scrutiny to the allocation of SSI benefits to certain individuals);
R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 183–84 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (endorsing a more
stringent rational basis standard to the unequal award of retirement benefits based on seniority
status); see also supra note 86 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Maltz, supra note 6, at 267–68 (recounting Justice Rehnquist’s strong opposition to the
more muscular rational basis scrutiny suggested in early drafts of the Court’s opinion in Murgia);
see also Fritz, 449 U.S. at 175–77 (insisting on highly deferential judicial review under the rational basis test).
See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649–54 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (opposing heightened scrutiny for alienage classifications); Weber v. Aetna, 406 U.S. 164, 177–82
(1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (opposing the more careful review the Court accorded a legitimacy classification).
Eyer, supra note 80, at 533; see also Maltz, supra note 6, at 267–68 (citing similar sentiments
Justice Rehnquist expressed to his colleagues during the Court’s deliberations on Murgia).
See Fritz, 449 U.S 166 (six-Justice majority adopting Justice Rehnquist’s highly deferential formulation of the rational basis test). A little over a decade later, the Court was nearly unanimous
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nan ultimately failed in making such review more stringent, the issue remained undecided in 1985. Indeed, in the few years prior, the Court decided several equal protection cases where the majority’s ostensible application of rational basis review was viewed by many as more stringent than
the classic, toothless scrutiny featured in such canonical cases as Railway
Express v. New York92 and Williamson v. Lee Optical.93
This backdrop makes clear that, in Cleburne, the prospect of relatively
more stringent rational basis review remained a viable option, with multiple
supporters on the Court.94 And, indeed, at least some Justices were already

92
93

94

in embracing an extremely deferential version of rational basis scrutiny. In Nordlinger v. Hahn,
505 U.S. 1, 3–18 (1992), Justice Blackmun wrote for seven Justices upholding an acquisitionvalue property tax valuation scheme under very deferential rational basis review. Justice Thomas
concurred, arguing for an even more deferential approach. Id. at 25–28 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Only Justice Stevens, in dissent, argued for more careful scrutiny. Id. at 28–31. The next year in
FCC v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307, 309–17 (1993), Justice Thomas wrote for eight
Justices (with Justice Stevens again the outlier, id. at 320 (Stevens, J., concurring)) in upholding
a television satellite regulation, again employing very deferential review. After the early 1980s,
the only garden-variety equal protection case resulting in a loss for the government was the unanimous opinion authored by then-Chief Justice Rehnquist in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal v. Commission of Webster County, 488 U.S. 336, 344–46 (1989). At first blush it might appear ironic
that Rehnquist (by then the Chief Justice) authored Allegheny County. But the irony disappears
when one realizes that, as Chief Justice, he would have had the power to assign the majority
opinion, and that he might well have assigned it to himself in order to ensure that the opinion was
written in a limited fashion.
336 U.S. 106, 110–11 (1949).
348 U.S. 483, 484 (1955). But see Hooper v. Bernalillo County, 472 U.S. 612, 618–23 (1982)
(holding that a New Mexico tax exemption statute benefitting some veterans but not others violated equal protection); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–30 (1982) (holding that a state law
denying education to undocumented children was irrational and thus violated equal protection);
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 55–65 (1982) (finding that Alaska dividend distribution plan violates the Equal Protection Clause because it irrationally distinguished between citizens who established their residence before 1959 and those who did so afterward). Perhaps reflecting this
lack of consensus, Justice Blackmun’s notes of the April 26 conference appear to attribute the
following statement or viewpoint to Justice Stevens: “we here [or have] no agree on rational basis.” Blackmun Papers, supra note 52.
In addition to Brennan and Powell, as noted earlier in the text, Justice Stevens indicated that he
might have viewed the Cleburne ordinance as failing his own understanding of rational basis review. See Powell Papers, supra note 47; see also infra note 96. And, indeed, his concurrence,
joined by Chief Justice Burger, embraced such a view. Nor was this the only time Justice Stevens voted based on this more stringent understanding of what equal protection required in a
garden-variety case of social and economic regulation. See Fritz, 449 U.S. at 180. Moreover,
the Cleburne Court itself relied on then-recent stringent applications of rational basis review. In
particular, the May 29 draft cited a 1982 case featuring such review as support for the proposition that “[t]he State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so
attenuated as to render that distinction arbitrary or irrational.” May 29 Draft, supra note 44 (citing Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61–63 (1982)).
In addition to Justice Stevens, at least one other justice was perceived by Justice Blackmun as
amenable to the Court deciding the case by affirming the Fifth Circuit’s result on a rationality
ground. See Blackmun Papers, supra note 52, Conference Notes (Mar. 20, 1985) (including the
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thinking in those terms when Cleburne came to the Court. What appear to
be Justice Powell’s notes on his law clerk’s bench memo indicate that he
(Powell) was open to the argument that the city’s permit denial failed rational basis scrutiny.95 Justice Powell’s conference notes also suggest that
Justice Stevens believed that the city’s permit denial should fail, under his
own, unified, standard of equal protection review.96 Justice Brennan believed, at least from the date of the post-argument conference, that the intellectually disabled constituted a suspect class;97 thus, his views on the rational basis question are unknown. Interestingly, Justice Powell’s notes
indicate that even Justice Rehnquist was not sure the city’s actions could
satisfy rationality review.98
3. The Remand Discussion
It was against this backdrop that the Court considered Cleburne in the
spring of 1985. As noted earlier, Justices Powell’s and Blackmun’s conference notes reveal that five Justices (Burger, White, Rehnquist, Powell, and
O’Connor) favored a remand to the lower court to apply rational basis review,99 of whom three (Rehnquist, Powell, and O’Connor) suggested the
ordinance could not satisfy.100 Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, when Justice

95

96

97
98

99
100

notation “2 rationality +”). The record suggests that he might have had in mind either Justice
Powell or Justice O’Connor.
See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Memorandum from Annmarie Levins to Powell, J., 4 (Mar. 5,
1985) (depicting the handwritten notation “I agree” next to the memo’s statement, underlined in
the same color as the notation, that “the City’s action can be held unconstitutional as applied under the rational relationship test”).
See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Conference Notes (Mar. 20, 1985) (containing Justice Stevens’ notes of March 20 conference indicating his position on rational basis review); see also
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 451 (Stevens, J., concurring).
See Blackmun Papers, supra note 52, Conference Notes (Apr. 26, 1985); Powell Papers, supra
note 47, Conference Notes (Mar. 20, 1985).
See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Conference Notes (Mar. 20, 1985). Justice Blackmun’s notes
are not as clear on Rehnquist’s position. The only clue is that his notes of Rehnquist’s position at
the April 26 conference conclude with what appears to read “cd go to JPS?” Blackmun Papers,
supra note 52, Conference Notes (Apr. 26, 1985). If that notation means that Rehnquist would
have considered joining an opinion written by Justice Stevens, that would support Justice Powell’s notes of the March 20 conference, since Justice Stevens believed that the Court should strike
the city’s action down on a rational basis ground.
See supra note 52 (including the Justices’ notes regarding rational basis review).
See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Conference Notes (Mar. 20, 1985) (indicating that Powell,
Rehnquist, and O’Connor thought the ordinance might fail rational basis scrutiny); but see
Blackmun Papers, supra note 52, Conference Notes (Mar. 20, 1985) (counting only two votes for
the proposition that the ordinance failed rational basis scrutiny). Justice Blackmun’s notes seem
to suggest that Justice Powell did not actively participate in the March 20 conference or did not
speak. This would make sense given that he was ill at the time and did not participate in the oral
argument. See Eskridge, supra note 6, at 2263; E-mail from Renea Hicks, supra note 52. This
would also explain the discrepancy in vote-counting between the two Justices. Nevertheless,
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White circulated the first draft of that opinion, on May 29, it focused almost exclusively on rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that the intellectually disabled merited explicitly heightened scrutiny.
The draft concluded with a short section remanding the case to the Fifth
Circuit to apply the rational basis standard. That section noted that that
standard gave the government the latitude it needed to respond to the needs
of that group. But, perhaps hinting at the concerns expressed by some of
the Justices,101 it also cautioned that, even under such review, the “relationship” to the “asserted goal” of the statute must not be “so attenuated as to
render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.”102 Addressing the other component of rational basis scrutiny, the draft also warned that “some objectives—such as ‘a bare . . . desire to harm a politically powerless group’—
are not legitimate state interests.”103 Observing that the Court of Appeals
had not applied rational basis scrutiny, given its conclusion that intermediate scrutiny was the proper standard, and noting that the issue was “clouded” by a state law question that had not been presented originally, the draft
would have remanded the case.
On June 3, five days after Justice White circulated his draft, there was a
flurry of activity in the case. Justice Rehnquist joined the opinion, Justice
Brennan wrote that he would “await the dissent,” and, perhaps most significantly of all, Justice Stevens wrote to reiterate his view that the Court
should decide the merits of the case rather than remanding.104 While it was
probably not surprising, Justice Stevens’ communication confirmed that at

101
102
103

104

Powell’s own notes provide extensive commentary on his own position, and suggest he was a
third vote in the remand bloc for the possibility that the ordinance would fail rational basis scrutiny.
Justice Blackmun’s April 26 conference notes indicate that he counted five votes in favor of reversing and remanding. See Blackmun Papers, supra note 52, Conference Notes (Apr. 26, 1985).
Those notes also suggest that Justices Powell and O’Connor harbored doubts about the ordinance’s ability to survive rational basis, with Justice O’Connor open to the possibility of affirming the Fifth Circuit’s decision on a rational basis ground, rather than remanding. Interestingly,
Blackmun records Justice Rehnquist as saying, “cd go to JPS?”—presumably meaning that he
could see himself joining an opinion by Justice Stevens. Throughout the Justices’ deliberations
Justice Stevens favored affirming the Fifth Circuit on a rational basis ground. See Powell Papers,
supra note 43, March 20 conference notes; see also Blackmun Papers, supra note 46, Conference
Notes (Mar. 20, 1985); id. at Conference Notes (Apr. 26, 1985).
See supra note 100 (noting particular Justices’ doubts that the city’s actions satisfied even rational basis review).
May 29 Draft, supra note 48, at 12.
Id. at 13 (quoting Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)). The Court also observed that
any substantive rights the plaintiffs had been deprived of remained subject to judicial protection
as well. Id.
See Powell Papers, supra note 47 (including letters from Justices Rehnquist, Brennan, and Stevens); Blackmun Papers, supra note 52 (same). Justice O’Connor joined Justice White’s opinion
the next day. See Blackmun Papers, supra note 52, Letter from O’Connor, J. to White, J. (June
4, 1985).
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least four members of the Court—the three Justices (Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun) who urged the application of heightened scrutiny, and Justice Stevens himself—would call for deciding the case, rather than remanding it.105
These developments put Justice Powell in the familiar position of swing
vote, given his earlier-noted106 ambivalence about remanding or deciding
the case. Two days later, he wrote Justice White, urging that the Court decide the case, and do so on rational basis grounds, rather than remanding
the case for consideration of the rational basis argument.107 Importantly,
after laying out his argument for the Court itself to strike the law down on
rational basis grounds, he then offered that, if the Court adopted his suggestion, “[i]t would then be unnecessary to consider the quasi-suspect class
question.”108
Focusing for now on the remand issue,109 perhaps the most interesting
repercussion of Justice Powell’s June 5 letter is the reaction it generated
from Justice Rehnquist. That same day, Rehnquist wrote to White to urge
rejection of Powell’s suggestion that the Court jettison the May 29 draft’s
analysis of the suspect class issue. After then restating his support for the
draft’s remand result, he continued: “but it would not bother me greatly to
see the Court opinion decide the validity of the ordinance under the rational
basis test.”110
Justice Rehnquist’s willingness to decide the case on rational basis
grounds is a surprise. As scholars have noted after examining both his
opinions and his internal communications at the Court, Justice Rehnquist
was a leading force for adopting an extremely deferential brand of rationality review.111 Just five years before Cleburne, in Railroad Retirement
Board v. Fritz,112 his majority opinion sharply engaged Justice Brennan’s
dissent urging a more muscular level of rationality review.113 Given the
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But see Blackmun Papers, supra note 52 (indicating that as of the March 20 conference there
were five votes for deciding the case: two votes for affirming the Fifth Circuit’s result for the
plaintiffs, but on a rational basis ground, in addition to the three votes who would have applied
heightened scrutiny and affirmed on that basis).
See supra note 52.
Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Powell, J. to White, J. (June 5, 1985).
Id. Justice Powell’s letter also introduced another issue into the Court’s deliberation—the distinction between invalidating the law on its face, as opposed to applied. This issue is treated later
in this Article. See infra Part II.B.
Cf. Letter from Powell, J. to White, J., supra note 107 (introducing the facial/as-applied issue
into the justices’ deliberations).
Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Rehnquist, J. to White, J. (June 5, 1985).
See, e.g., Eyer, supra note 86; Maltz, supra note 6; Saphire, supra note 2 (describing Justice
Rehnquist as “a leading proponent for an exceptionally deferential rational bas[i]s standard”).
449 U.S. 166 (1980).
See id. at 176 n.10.
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seeming strength of his preference, it is striking to see him in Cleburne
casually remarking that “it would not bother [him] greatly” to see the Court
use “the rational basis test” to decide this case.114
To be sure, Justice Rehnquist may not have thought that such a decision
would in fact go against the city—it’s possible that he foresaw Chief Justice Burger and Justice O’Connor rejecting that outcome, with the result
that a rational basis strike-down would be embraced only by a minority of
the Court (Powell, Stevens, and possibly White115). Nevertheless, it bears
remembering that he did not dissent from the heightened rational-basis review expressed in the final Court opinion. In terms of pure results, such a
dissent might not have mattered: between the Brennan-Marshall-Blackmun
bloc that would have struck down the city’s action as failing heightened
scrutiny and the nascent Powell-Stevens position favoring a rational basis
strike-down, five votes existed for the plaintiffs.116
But such a dissent might have mattered in terms of methodology. Even
though the final opinion garnered six votes, and thus did not depend on
Rehnquist’s assent, two of those six votes (Stevens, joined by Burger) expressed dissatisfaction with the entire idea of tiered scrutiny.117 Thus, if he
had defected from the rational-basis part of Justice White’s opinion, only
three Justices would have fully subscribed to the combination of the tiered
scrutiny structure and a muscular application of the lowest level of scrutiny. If Justice Rehnquist had dissented on that latter point, his opinion
could have pointed out the lack of consensus within the majority, and
would have set the stage for his continued campaign against a more searching version of rational basis review. But yet he did not dissent.118
Why not? One obvious possibility—which we should not discount—is
that he simply and forthrightly thought that the city’s actions did in fact fail
even his deferential approach to rational basis review, or at least that he

114
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Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Rehnquist, J. to White, J. (June 5, 1985).
See Eyer, supra note 80 at 547–53 (noting Justice White’s support for proposed stronger applications of rational basis review in Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976)); but see
supra note 98 (Powell and Blackmun notes suggesting that Rehnquist was unsure whether the
city’s actions could survive rational basis scrutiny).
See also Blackmun Papers, supra note 52 (noting that at the April 26 conference there appeared
to be two votes to affirm the Fifth Circuit on rational basis grounds).
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985) (Stevens, J., joined by
Burger, C.J., concurring).
Of course, it is possible that Justice Rehnquist would not have known how Justices Stevens and
Burger would eventually vote and write in Cleburne. Still, he clearly should have known that
Justice Stevens would likely have questioned the tiered scrutiny enterprise, or at least not signed
on to it wholeheartedly. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (expressing doubt about that doctrine). Thus, Justice Rehnquist could have foreseen that
the combination of adherence to that structure and muscular application of rational basis review
would have garnered a majority only if he signed on to it.
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was sufficiently unsure about that question that he was somewhat indifferent to the result.119 A hint to his thinking comes in the second paragraph of
his June 5 letter to Justice White. After reiterating his support for the May
29 draft’s remand result but expressing a willingness to concede the point
and have the Court decide the constitutionality of the city’s actions, Justice
Rehnquist then went on to what seemed to be his real objection to Powell’s
suggestion. The second (and final) paragraph of his letter is quoted fully
here:
Lewis [Powell] in his letter also suggests that in this event [i.e., that the Court
decides the case on rational-basis grounds] it would be “unnecessary to consider the quasi-suspect class question.” I would hope that you would not subscribe to this idea, because it would result in the case deciding absolutely nothing that was not already well known before we took it. The issue presented by
the case was whether or not “heightened scrutiny” should be employed to review equal protection claims where made by the mentally retarded: the Court of
Appeals held that it should be, and we granted certiorari, I thought, to decide
that question. To simply “punt” and turn this case into one of five or six hundred decisions of this Court applying rational basis equal protection analysis to
a particular ordinance would, to my mind, rob the decision of any importance
120
which it would otherwise have.

Clearly, it mattered to Justice Rehnquist that the Court decide the suspect class question. Avoiding that issue would, in his view, “result in the
Court deciding absolutely nothing that was not already well known.”121
The Court “granted certiorari, [he] thought, to decide that question.”122
(Circumstantial support for that last assertion comes from Justice Powell’s
conference notes, which identify Rehnquist, joined by O’Connor and Burger, as voting to grant certiorari, with White and Blackmun each “joining
three” to provide the necessary numbers for a grant.123 Rehnquist and
O’Connor were, along with White, perhaps the Justices most insistent on
deciding the suspect class question.)124 Finally, it is striking, in light of his
campaign against more stringent rational basis scrutiny, that he minimized
the significance of a rational basis decision: as he dismissively stated, “[t]o
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See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Rehnquist, J. to White, J. (June 5, 1985).
Id.
Id.
See Powell Papers, supra note 47.
The Court’s grant of certiorari was not accompanied by specific questions the Court wished to
see briefed. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1984). However, the
city’s certiorari petition presented two questions, both of which related to the suspect class status
of intellectual disability. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432 (No. 84468), 1984 U.S. Supreme Court Briefs LEXIS 506, 506 (“Questions Presented: 1. Whether mentally retarded persons are a ‘quasi-suspect’ class for purposes of Equal Protection analysis. 2.
Whether for Equal Protection analysis, all legislation affecting mentally retarded persons must be
tested by an ‘intermediate’ or ‘heightened’ level of scrutiny.”).
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simply ‘punt’ and turn this case into one of five or six hundred decisions of
this Court applying rational basis equal protection analysis to a particular
ordinance would, to [his] mind, rob the decision of any importance which it
would otherwise have.”125
Justice Rehnquist’s insistence on deciding the level of scrutiny issue,
when combined with his seemingly casual willingness to accede to Justice
Powell’s suggestion that the Court itself apply rational basis scrutiny rather
than remand that issue to the Court of Appeals, likely provided the impetus
for what turned out to be the Court’s seemingly odd, “two for the price of
one”126 approach to the case. Justice White himself quickly echoed Justice
Rehnquist’s relative preferences.127 Responding to Justice Powell the next
day (June 6), White insisted on the appropriateness of the Court deciding
the suspect class question.128 He used strong language similar to
Rehnquist’s,129 even suggesting a reassignment of the opinion if a majority
felt differently.130 By contrast, after repeating his preference for remanding
the case for the lower court to apply the rational basis standard, he concluded by saying that he “could perhaps accommodate [himself]” to deciding the validity issue. Even more strikingly, he continued that, should the
Court wish to reach that issue, he could also accommodate himself “to either result that the majority might reach on that question.”131
To be sure, it might not be that surprising that Justice White was “accommodating” on the question of the ultimate result. The Justices’ internal
deliberations in other cases—most notably in Massachusetts Bd of Retirement v. Murgia from nine years earlier—reflected that White was at least
somewhat sympathetic to the more muscular, Powell/Brennan approach to
rationality review.132 Thus, unlike Justice Rehnquist’s seeming willingness
125

126
127

128
129

130
131
132

Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Rehnquist, J. to White, J. (June 5, 1985).
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 456 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotations omitted).
Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from White, J. to Powell, J. (June 6, 1985). Justice
O’Connor also quickly signaled her agreement with Justice Rehnquist’s approach, in a brief note
to Justice White, copied to Justices Powell and Rehnquist, dated June 6. See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from O’Connor, J. to White, J. (June 6, 1985),.
Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from White, J. to Powell, J. (June 6, 1985).
Id. (“I see no persuasive reason for not announcing that rationality is the governing standard.
This is the issue we took this case to decide, there is a clear majority for that standard, and not
saying so will leave in place an erroneous Fifth Circuit precedent that will govern the District
Courts in that Circuit. I doubt that we would have granted this case had it involved only whether
the rational basis standard had been properly applied; yet confining our decision to the rationality
of the zoning law indicates a contrary result.”).
Id.
Id.
Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam). See Eyer, supra note 80,
at 547–53 (noting Justice White’s support for proposed stronger applications of rational basis review in Murgia).
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to accept a rational basis strike-down of the Cleburne ordinance, Justice
White’s willingness is at least somewhat consistent with his past positions.
But just like Justice Rehnquist, Justice White was also primarily concerned
with settling the standard of review question—recall that it was on answering that question that he insisted on his way, at the cost of his giving up the
authorship of the opinion.
Perhaps this priority should not be surprising. After all, in Cleburne the
Court was dealing with a circuit court decision explicitly conferring heightened scrutiny on a particular class. That decision had direct and immediate
applications, at least within the circuit itself.133 Justices, such as Rehnquist,
who may otherwise have cared more about stopping implicit moves toward
more muscular rationality review may have been even more concerned
about stopping lower courts from expanding the set of classifications receiving explicitly heightened scrutiny. The same might have been even
truer for Justices, such as White, who were more sympathetic to such muscular rationality review.
In other words, compromising with Justice Powell on whether the Court
should perform the rational basis analysis itself—and even on the result of
that analysis—might have been perceived as an acceptable price for ensuring a majority for rejecting the appellate court’s suspect class analysis. After all, with three Justices planning on endorsing the lower court’s analysis,
and Justice Stevens coy on the question,134 there was no margin for error if
the remaining Justices wished to use Cleburne as a vehicle to discourage
lower courts from expanding the universe of suspect and quasi-suspect
classifications.135 Perhaps other of those Justices might have agreed with
Rehnquist that a rational-basis strike-down of the ordinance would have
counted as simply, in his words, “one of five or six hundred decisions of
this Court applying rational basis equal protection analysis to a particular
ordinance.”136 Certainly, before Justice White circulated his draft rational
basis analysis on June 11, the risk of Cleburne becoming an important rational basis precedent seemed, at most, highly speculative. Given that fact,

133
134
135

136

See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from White, J. to Powell, J. (June 6, 1985).
See Blackmun Papers, supra note 52, Conference Notes (Mar. 20, 1985) (noting that Stevens
might be willing to join Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun).
It bears repeating that Burger, Rehnquist and O’Connor—three of the justices most skeptical of
expanding the list of suspect classifications—were the three to vote to grant certiorari in
Cleburne, with White and Blackmun “joining three” and thus granting the petition. See Powell
Papers, supra note 47.
Cf. Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Powell, J. to Brennan, J. (June 10, 1985), (predicting that Cleburne’s suspect class “will be the precedent that counts”).
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it is perhaps not surprising that, for the major players involved, the suspect
class issue loomed larger than the rational basis issue.137
B. A Facial Or As-Applied Strike-Down?
1. The Progress Toward The As-Applied Approach
For many scholars, the defining feature of Cleburne’s unusually muscular rational basis analysis is its insistence on record evidence supporting the
rationality of the statute’s classification.138 As conceived in its most deferential form, rational basis review does not demand such actual evidentiary
support. Instead, as expressed in a foundational statement of such deferential review coming at the very start of the post-Lochner era, “the existence
of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed,” and laws
reviewed under this standard are “not to be pronounced unconstitutional
unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of
such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.”139 In
later years, and extending into the Warren Court, that foundational statement blossomed into canonical equal protection rational basis cases in
which the Court indulged in extravagant speculation about the possible
support for challenged legislation that seemed to fit poorly with its asserted
justifications.140 Cleburne, by faulting the city’s justifications for lacking
137

138
139

140

To be sure, this explanation encounters the difficulty that, after Justice White circulated the
fourth draft of the opinion, and the first to feature his rational basis analysis, Justice Rehnquist
nevertheless immediately joined. See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Rehnquist, J. to
White, J. (June 12, 1985). Thus, when confronted with what became Cleburne’s unusually stringent rationality review, Justice Rehnquist still demurred (as did Justice O’Connor, who on June
12 sent Justice White a note reading simply “Dear Byron, I am still with you on this.”). Powell
Papers, supra note 47, Letter from O’Connor, J. to White, J. (June 12, 1985).
See, e.g., Saphire, supra note 2, at 613, 621.
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). To be sure, in Carolene
Products, Justice Stone explicitly referred to “regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions” as the type of legislation subject to this deferential judicial review. Id. Nevertheless, as the Court’s tiered scrutiny structure rigidified, this type of extremely deferential review was held to apply to equal protection challenges to laws of any type except those that drew
suspect (or, later, quasi-suspect) classifications or those that implicated fundamental rights. See,
e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (describing a statute to which the Court
applied such deferential review as “involv[ing] the most basic human needs of impoverished
human beings”).
See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (speculating that a
law that banned advertising on some trucks but not others, based on the ownership of the truck,
furthered the city’s asserted interest in traffic safety); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426
(1961) (“A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify it.”) (citations omitted). See also Maltz, supra note 6, at 265 (citing
McGowan as an example of the Warren Court’s embrace of highly deferential rational basis review).
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support in the record,141 deviated from this rule. As noted earlier, scholars
have cited this deviation as one of the defining characteristics of both this
case and the more muscular rational basis review that became associated
with it.142
The previous section suggested how this aspect of Cleburne—and, indeed, its rational basis analysis more generally—did not attract unusual attention from the Justices, other than on the basic question whether the
Court would perform that analysis at all or simply remand the case for the
lower court to perform it.143 But the Justices’ papers suggest that the record-evidence requirement might itself have been the unintended by-product
of their resolution of another conflict: between striking down the Cleburne
ordinance as applied to the plaintiffs’ particular group home, as opposed to
on its face.
The as-applied/facial issue arose early in the Justices’ deliberations.
Justice Powell’s post-oral argument notes indicate that he believed that the
Cleburne ordinance failed rational basis review “on its face.”144 Moreover,
on May 29, during the early discussion of whether the Court should remand
the case for application of rational basis scrutiny, Justice Powell’s clerk,
arguing against remand, raised the as-applied/facial issue, urging that the
facial validity of the ordinance was properly before the Court for decision.145 Justice Powell’s handwritten notes on that memo state that the
clerk “makes a persuasive argument for holding the ordinance invalid on its
face.”146
Nevertheless, it was only after Justice White acquiesced to Justice Powell’s wish that the Court itself apply rational basis review that the asapplied/facial issue fully manifested. On June 5, Powell wrote White, arguing that resolving the standard of review question in favor of rational basis still left open questions about the ordinance’s facial and as-applied validity.147 He argued (apparently for a second time, given his post-oral
argument conference notes148 ) in favor of a facial strike down. Because the
141
142
143
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See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 448, 450 (1984); see also id. at
455 (Stevens, J., concurring) (referring to the record as well).
See, e.g., Saphire, supra note 2, at 613, 621.
Most notably, Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor reconfirmed their joins of Justice White’s opinion one day after he circulated the first full draft opinion including his rational basis analysis,
without any comment. See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from O’Connor, J. to White, J.
(June 12, 1985); Id. Letter from Rehnquist, J. to White, J. (June 12, 1985). But see infra note
170 (noting one small change Justice Rehnquist requested in that analysis when it was circulated
to the Court before being incorporated into a complete draft opinion).
See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Conference Notes (Mar. 20, 1985).
See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Memorandum from Annmarie to Powell, J. (May 29, 1985).
Id.
Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Powell, J. to White, J. (June 5, 1985).
See Powell Papers, supra note 47 (notes of the March 20 conference).
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discussion became somewhat confused, it might help to specify what Justice Powell meant by a facial strike-down. Justice Powell argued that the
ordinance’s lumping together of the intellectually disabled with other
groups, such as insane persons and drug addicts, lacked any rational basis
on its face—that is, without any reference to the particulars of a given
group home for intellectually disabled persons.149
Justice White responded the next day, in a letter to Justice Powell on
which he copied the conference, disagreeing with that approach.150 He noted the Court’s general preference for performing as-applied review before
considering a facial strike-down. Turning to the Cleburne ordinance, he
cited the wide variance in intellectual disability, and concluded that he
“f[ound] it difficult to believe that the special permit requirement would be
invalid with respect to each and every group of the mentally retarded.”151
He concluded that “[i]t may be that in light of the characteristics of the
group involved in this case and in light of the city’s proffered justifications,
the special permit cannot constitutionally be denied. But this would not be
a facial invalidity holding.”152
The same day Justice White circulated his letter to Justice Powell to the
conference, Justice O’Connor stepped in to offer her support to Justice
White. In a note to White, copies of which she circulated only to Powell
and Rehnquist, O’Connor wrote that she “will still be with [White] if
[White] decide[d] the statute is facially invalid, as Lewis [Powell] suggest[ed].”153 However, again reflecting the priorities shared by her and Justice Rehnquist, she continued: “[B]ut I also agree with Bill Rehnquist that
we should decide the quasi-suspect class issue in any event.”154
Justice O’Connor’s note made clear that White had support regardless
of what he did on the as-applied/facial issue, as long as he held firm on the
Court deciding the suspect class question. At this point, we can begin to
see the outlines of Cleburne’s various oddities. Consider first the eventual
opinion’s decision both to decide the suspect class question and strike
down the city’s action on rational basis grounds—the “two for the price of
one” decision-making Justice Marshall criticized in his dissent. The individual Justices’ preferences suggest that Justice White may have had no real choice but to decide both issues. With three dissenters planning on arguing that the intellectually disabled constituted a suspect or quasi-suspect
class, and with Justice Stevens having expressed ambivalence about the
149
150
151
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154

Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Powell, J. to White, J. (June 5, 1985).
Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from White, J. to Powell, J. (June 6, 1985).
Id.
Id.
Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from O’Connor, J. to White, J. (June 6, 1985).
Id.
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need to perform suspect class analysis, Justice White had no further votes
to lose on the suspect class question.155 With Justice Powell now insisting
that the Court should itself use rational basis scrutiny to decide the case,
and with White’s allies (Rehnquist and O’Connor) acquiescing in such an
approach as long as the Court committed itself to deciding the suspect class
issue, we can see how perhaps Justice White, despite his continued preference for remanding the case to the lower court for application of rational
basis review,156 might have decided to give in to Powell as the price of
keeping his majority on the suspect class issue. But when Powell notified
White on June 7 that he had come around to accepting the appropriateness
of deciding the suspect class question,157 there was no longer any need to
press him on that question. Instead, for Justice White the path of least resistance lay through addressing both the suspect class and rational basis issues.
But the facial/as-applied issue remained unresolved.
Justice
O’Connor’s letter suggested that she and, by implication, Justice Rehnquist
remained relatively unconcerned about that issue. But Justice White remained firm on this question: in contrast to his accommodating attitude on
the remand question, he insisted that any application of rational basis review result, at most, in a strike-down of the city’s actions as applied to its
conduct in this particular case.
Now it was Justice Powell’s turn to bend. Perhaps convinced by his
law clerk, who wrote a memo to him on June 6 suggesting that an asapplied strike-down was also appropriate,158 Justice Powell wrote to Justice
White the next day, June 7, expressing a willingness to “join four to make a
Court” striking down the city’s action on an as-applied basis.159
This might have resolved the question, and cemented the Court’s ultimate approaches to both the remand and the facial/as-applied issues. But
one last flurry, from a perhaps unexpected source, provided a final bit of
drama. June 7, 1985, was a Friday.160 The following Monday, June 10,
155
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160

Justice Stevens eventually joined Justice White’s opinion for the Court, even though his own
concurrence—especially its critique of suspect class analysis—stands in considerable tension
with much of the opinion he joined.
Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from White, J. to Powell, J. (June 6, 1985) (noting that he
“much prefer[red]” remanding to the lower court to apply rational basis scrutiny).
See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Powell, J. to White, J. (June 7, 1985) (“In my letter of June 5 [to White, the recipient of the June 7 letter], I expressed the view that if we held the
ordinance facially invalid it would be unnecessary to consider the quasi-suspect class question.
There is a good deal to your point, however, that the question is here and needs resolving. I
would be willing to join an opinion holding that only the rational basis standard is applicable.”).
See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Memorandum from Annmarie Levins to Powell, J. (June 6,
1985).
See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Powell, J. to White, J. (June 7, 1985).
See Calendar for Year 1985 (United States), TIMEANDDATE.COM, http://www.timeanddate.com/
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Justice Brennan wrote Justice Powell, copying the conference. That brief
note stated that Brennan had reviewed Powell’s correspondence with
White, and observed that, given Powell’s preference for a facial strikedown of the statute, there appeared to be a majority for that proposition,
“although perhaps on varying grounds.”161 (Those varying grounds, of
course, would have been the differing standards that embryonic coalition
might have deemed appropriate for reviewing the ordinance: rational basis
for Powell, and perhaps Stevens, and heightened scrutiny for Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun.162 )
It was now Justice Powell’s turn to defend his prior commitments. Responding that same day, he wrote Brennan that he had already committed
to “consider[ing]” an opinion striking down the action on as-applied basis.163 Powell may have felt obliged to say that, and thus reject Brennan’s
proposed new coalition, because that same day (June 10), White had written Powell stating that he was going to “make a try” at an opinion invalidating the law on an as-applied basis, and reminding him of Powell’s openness to joining four on such an opinion, which he (Powell) had expressed
the previous Friday.164 Tantalizingly, Justice White’s June 10 note referred
to a “conversation” he and Powell had had earlier that day. It is quite possible, then, that Justice Brennan’s note of that same date, offering a majority for a facial strike-down, triggered Justice White to reach out to Powell
either by phone or in person, perhaps to remind him of his June 7 commitment to joining four for an as-applied strike down.
As noted above, Justice Powell responded to Justice Brennan that same
day, reminding Brennan of the commitment he (Powell) had made to

161
162

163
164

calendar/?year=1985&country=1 (last visited Jan. 3., 2017).
Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Brennan, J. to Powell, J. (June 10, 1985); see also
Blackmun Papers, supra note 52.
On this point it is worth noting that Justice Powell’s clerk had earlier in the process (May 29)
suggested to Powell that, if Powell agreed to it, Justice Marshall’s draft dissent might become the
majority, given that Justices Brennan and Blackmun were known to agree with Marshall, and that
Justice Stevens was planning on announcing his willingness to join an opinion striking down the
ordinance on its face. See Memorandum from Annmarie Levins to Powell, J., supra note 135, at
2 n.1. Moreover, the clerk informed Justice Powell that Marshall’s opinion was likely to be written in a way that would allow a Justice to join any one (or more) of several different rationales
for striking the law down. Id. at 2. Perhaps Brennan had that structure in mind when he suggested that Powell might be able easily to join the part of that anticipated opinion that struck down
the law on its face for failing rational basis scrutiny, without having to join the part arguing for
and applying heightened scrutiny. Indeed, Marshall did not circulate a draft of his dissent until
June 24, two weeks after Brennan’s overture to Powell.
Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Powell, J. to Brennan, J. (June 10, 1985); Blackmun
Papers, supra note 52.
Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from White, J. to Powell, J. (June 10, 1985); see also
Blackmun Papers, supra note 52.
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White.165 But, interestingly, he also noted that he had come to believe that
the opinion should in fact establish rational basis as the appropriate standard—a real evolution from his earlier thinking where he had wondered
whether a rational-basis strike-down by the Court would render the suspect
class analysis “unnecessary.”166 Indeed, in a final statement of the evolution of his thinking, he concluded his rejection of Brennan’s overture by
stating that “[t]his [the suspect class analysis] will be the precedent that
counts.”167
2. The As-Applied Analysis
Perhaps motivated by Justice Brennan’s lobbying of Powell, or perhaps
simply spurred on by the looming end of the term, Justice White acted
quickly to draft the rational basis analysis striking down the city’s action.
He appears to have circulated a partial revised draft, focusing on that analysis, on June 10, although records of this draft do not appear in the papers
examined.168 A full draft was circulated the next day.169 With the important exception of the as-applied versus facial nature of the Court’s final
decision, the analysis in his June 11 draft largely took the form that would
eventually appear in the final opinion for the Court. Most notably, it began
by noting the neighborhood opposition to the group home, and rejecting
that opposition (to the extent it was motivated by fear or dislike of the
would-be residents) as a legitimate interest that might justify the permit denial.170
165

166
167
168

169
170

That commitment was made in a June 7 letter from Powell to White, on which Powell copied the
conference. See See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Powell, J. to White, J. (June 7,
1985). Thus, Brennan would have been aware of that commitment.
See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Powell, J. to White, J. (June 5, 1985).
Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Powell, J. to Brennan, J. (June 10, 1985).
See Papers of J. Byron White (on file with the Library of Congress, Box II:28, Folder 1) [hereinafter White Papers], Letter from Rehnquist, J. to White, J. (June 11, 1985), (referring to “the partial draft which you sent down yesterday,” and continuing “I assume that the part of the opinion
presently circulating which holds that ‘heightened scrutiny’ is not required will remain as is.”).
See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Third Draft (June 11, 1985) [hereinafter June 11 Draft]; see
also Blackmun Papers, supra note 52; White Papers, supra note 168.
June 11 Draft, supra note 169. One change on this point was prompted by Justice Rehnquist.
After beginning its analysis with the following statement, “[f]irst, the Council was concerned
with the negative attitude of the majority of property owners located within 200 feet of the
Featherston facility, as well as with the fears of elderly residents of the neighborhood,” the thusfar unrecovered June 10 draft apparently moved directly and unambiguously to condemn such attitudes and fears. In his June 11 letter, Justice Rehnquist requested a softening of that condemnation. He wrote:
I agree with you that just “negative attitude” or “fear” of neighbors, without any substantiation of reasons for it, may not properly be considered by a zoning commission. But I
would like to at least reserve the question of whether “negative attitude” or “fear” that
has some sort of reasonable basis -- fear of decline in property value, and the like, may
not be considered as a factor.
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Continuing to follow the template that would appear in the final opinion, Justice White then considered the more legitimate justifications for the
city’s actions—flood evacuation, population density, and the like. In rejecting those justifications, his draft opinion expressed skepticism about the
existence of relevant differences differentiating the group home from other
land uses, such as sanitariums and old age homes, which did not require a
permit.171 The Court’s skepticism is notable, of course, given its tension
with conventional rational basis review, which indulges every presumption
favoring the government.172 Indeed, it was in this draft that Justice White’s
famous reference to the lack of record evidence appears—a reference that
reinforces the unusual skepticism of the Court’s analysis.173
For our purposes, the interesting point here is the connection between
this unusually stringent review and the as-applied character of the draft’s
analysis. Justice White began his rational basis review by squarely identifying its as-applied nature. He even took the time to justify that decision,
explaining (perhaps as a final argument to Justice Powell or perhaps simply
as reflecting his views on the issue) that as-applied review was favored
over facial review in constitutional cases, as it allows the Court to avoid
making “unnecessarily broad constitutional judgments.”174
But ambiguities immediately crept in to his description of the Court’s
analysis as as-applied. He noted the zoning ordinance’s lack of a permit
requirement for many multi-resident land uses, but then observed that the
ordinance did require such a permit for the Featherston home, “because it
would be a facility for the mentally retarded.”175 He then posed the question he set out to answer: “May the city deny the permit to this facility
when other care and multiple dwelling facilities are freely permitted?”176

171

172
173

174
175

176

White Papers, supra note 168, Letter from Rehnquist, J., to White, J. (June 11, 1985). He therefore requested the insertion of a new sentence immediately after the one quoted above, “to this
effect,” then offering the following sentence:
“But mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, is not a permissible basis for treating a home for the mentally retarded differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings, and the like.”
Id. Justice White incorporated this suggestion verbatim in the June 11 draft. See June 11 Draft,
supra note 169. It appears in the final version of the opinion. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1984).
June 11 Draft, supra note 169, at 13–14.
See supra notes 139–140 (noting instances of deferential review that were resolved in the government’s favor).
See June 11 Draft, supra note 169, at 16 (pointing out that the record fails to clarify why “the
characteristics of the intended occupants . . . justifies denying to those occupants what would be
permitted to [other] groups”).
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
Id.
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Justice White’s framing of the question reflects the ambiguity of the asapplied/facial distinction, at least as that distinction applied in this case.
On the one hand, he squarely stated that the review was as-applied. In addition, this draft focused on the permit denial (a particularized decision) rather than the underlying (general) requirement that any group home for the
intellectually disabled obtain a permit. Yet, quoting the trial court, he
framed the city’s action as resting on the fact that the would-be residents
were intellectually disabled, without any reference to the particular characteristics of the individuals who sought to live in the Featherston home. In
other words, it was possible to see the city’s action, as Justice White
framed it, as presenting a facial challenge to the inclusion of intellectual
disability within the list of characteristics that would trigger the permit requirement—as a general matter, without reference to the qualities of the
would-be occupants of the Featherston home, such as their location on the
intellectual disability spectrum.
This ambiguity was reflected in the analysis that followed in his draft.
While Justice White led off by citing the neighborhood opposition to the
particular facility at issue (the Featherston home), he then moved on to other objections (flood evacuation and the like), which the Court rejected in
general terms, rather than as applied to the would-be Featherston residents.
Justice Powell’s clerk—who, like her boss, had pushed for a facial invalidity ruling throughout the Justices’ deliberations—identified this ambiguity.177 She also raised the issue whether White’s draft addressed only the
permit denial, rather than the underlying requirement that the home obtain
a permit. In her view, because the plaintiffs challenged both decisions (that
a permit was required, and denying that permit), a decision striking down
only the denial did not fully dispose of the case.178
Justice Powell raised this latter point with Justice White in a letter dated
June 15.179 He stated that he believed that “modest changes” would make
clear that the (particular) denial and the (general) underlying permit requirement both violated equal protection. Justice White, in a draft dated
June 17, made those changes, substituting references to the permit denial
with references to the permit requirement itself.180 In a letter of that same
177
178
179
180

See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Memorandum from Annmarie to Justice Powell (June 13
1985).
See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Memorandum from Annmarie to Justice Powell (June 14,
1985).
See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Powell, J. to White, J. (June 15, 1985); see also
Blackmun Papers, supra note 52, Letter from Powell, J. to White, J. (June 15, 1985).
See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Fourth Draft (June 17, 1985) [hereinafter June 17 Draft];
White Papers, supra note 168. The matter, however, is not simple as this. The relevant changes
Justice White made to the June 11 draft simply replaced references to the city’s permit denial
with references to its requirement that the home obtain a permit. Compare June 11 Draft, supra
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date, however, he cautioned Powell that, “[i]f these changes do not satisfy
you, it seems to me that you are insisting on deciding the facial validity issue, which I thought you had agreed could be put aside.”181
In the next paragraph of that letter, Justice White set forth his concern
with a broader ruling. Such a ruling, he explained (again),182 could call into
question the city’s ability to insist on a permit in a case of more profoundly
intellectually disabled persons seeking to live together in a group setting.183
He expressed concern that a facial strike-down of the Cleburne ordinance
would make such regulation impossible.184 At this point Justice Powell
stopped pushing. That same day, June 17, he joined the opinion.185 Justic-

181

182

183
184
185

note 169, at 13 (“We inquire first whether denying a special use permit for the Featherston home
in the circumstances here deprives respondents of the equal protection of the laws.”) with June 17
Draft, supra at 13 (“We inquire first whether requiring a special use permit for the Featherston
home in the circumstances here deprives respondents of the equal protection of the laws.”).
Compare June 11 Draft, supra note 169, at 14 (“May the city deny the permit to this facility
when other care and multiple dwelling facilities are freely permitted?”) with June 17 Draft, supra
at 14 (“May the city require the permit for this facility when other care and multiple dwelling facilities are freely permitted?”). Compare June 11 Draft, supra note 169, at 14 (“The District
Court found that the City Council’s denial of the permit rested on several factors.”) with June 17
Draft, supra at 14 (“The District Court found that the City Council’s insistence on the permit
rested on several factors.”). Compare June 11 Draft, supra note 169, at 16 (“The short of it is
that denial of the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the
mentally retarded.”) with June 17 Draft, supra at 16 (“The short of it is that requiring the permit
in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded.”) (all
emphases added). Justice White’s simple—and perhaps artful—substitution of “require” for
“deny” thus addressed the (general) permit requirement, aiming to satisfy Justice Powell, while
nevertheless retaining the opinion’s ostensible as-applied focus on the particular action of the
city in requiring an ordinance for this particular group home. The problem here is that that requirement, even if White styled it a particularized imposition on the home at 201 Featherston,
was imposed by the generally-applicable terms of the ordinance. Thus, it appears as though Justice White might have been trying to convince Justice Powell that the Court really was deciding
the constitutionality of the permit requirement, while perhaps preserving the opinion’s as-applied
focus—even if that preservation came at the cost of misconstruing the generally-applicable nature of the ordinance’s permit requirement.
Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from White, J. to Powell, J. (June 17, 1985). Indeed, despite the changes Justice White made to accommodate Justice Powell’s June 15 request, see supra note 180, he retained the language disclaiming facial review of the ordinance and defending
his prioritization of as-applied review. Compare June 11 Draft, supra note 169, at 13 with June
17 Draft, supra note 180, at 13.
See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from White, J. to Powell, J. (June 6, 1985) (raising the
concern that the classification “mentally retarded” is so broad that a decision addressing that
group as a whole could invalidate otherwise lawful permits).
See id. (expressing the same concern); supra note 181 (citing a letter explaining Justice White’s
concern with a broad ruling).
See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from White, J. to Powell, J. (June 6, 1985) (expressing
the same concern); supra note 181.
See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Powell, J. to White, J. (June 17, 1985).
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es Stevens followed shortly, with Chief Justice Burger soon thereafter joining Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion.186
III. WAS CLEBURNE AN ACCIDENT?
Part II recounted the sequence of the Justices’ deliberations in
Cleburne, from the certiorari vote to Justice Powell’s decision to accept the
as-applied nature of Justice White’s analysis and join White’s opinion.
Part III reconsiders those deliberations, to examine what they suggest about
the decisional process in that case. This reconsideration will set the stage
for more general reflections about the Court, and the impact of its decisional processes on legal doctrine, in Part IV.
A. The Decision Not To Remand
The Court’s decision not to remand, but rather to decide the rational basis issue itself, constitutes the threshold puzzle in Cleburne. As noted in
Part I, Justice Marshall began his dissent by critiquing the Court’s performance of suspect class analysis, in light of its ultimate decision that the law
failed rational basis scrutiny. As Part II indicated, Justice Powell harbored
the same concern, although he eventually overcame his qualms and, indeed,
predicted that the suspect class analysis “will be the precedent that
counts.”187
The evidence identified in Part II suggests that the need to build a majority coalition might have lay behind Justice White’s decision to address
both issues. Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor appeared relatively indifferent to the prospect of the Court itself applying the rational basis standard,
as long as it also reached (and rejected) the lower court’s suspect class
analysis.188 Given the different weights to those preferences, Justice
White—who shared Rehnquist’s and O’Connor’s inclination to remand the

186

187
188

Justice Stevens joined it on June 19. See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Stevens, J. to
White, J. (June 19, 1985). Oddly, Chief Justice Burger appears never to have joined Justice
White’s majority, although he is customarily described as having done so. See supra note 47
(summarizing correspondence from Annmarie, not noting Chief Justice Burger’s decision to join
Justice White’s opinion). It may be that Burger’s join of Stevens’ opinion, which explicitly noted that Stevens “join[ed]” White’s opinion, constituted Burger’s own join. Id.
Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Powell, J. to Brennan, J. (June 10, 1985).
Indeed, Justice Rehnquist’s relatively mild reaction to Justice White’s rational basis analysis—
requesting nothing more than a mild caveat to the (possibly-lost) June 10 draft’s statement about
the inadmissibility of neighbors’ “negative attitudes” and “fear,” (see supra note 170)—suggests
that he was also not particularly concerned about the substance of that analysis. The papers examined lack any other reference to any objection to that analysis by either Rehnquist or
O’Connor (or anyone else on the Court).
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case—was free to accede to Justice Powell’s insistence and decide the issue.
Of course, it is ironic that Justice Rehnquist appeared to have given Justice White the green light to cater to Justice Powell and apply the rational
basis scrutiny the Court called for. As Part II explained, Justice Rehnquist
cared very much about limiting judicial review under the rational basis
standard. That preference was strong enough to lead him to characterize
the Court’s analysis in cases such as Craig as instituting a new, explicitly
intermediate, level of scrutiny, if that move helped immunize rational basis
scrutiny from the prospect of more intrusive judicial review.189
Yet Cleburne appears to have raised for Justice Rehnquist an even more
serious threat: the prospect of continued expansion of suspect and quasisuspect classifications. While he might have been willing to characterize
an otherwise-unclear majority opinion in Craig190 as instituting a new, “intermediate,” scrutiny level in exchange for cabining more muscular rational
basis review when the Court’s analysis itself was at issue,191 the situation
might have looked very different to him when what was at stake was a lower court’s decision explicitly enshrining such heightened review. Such a
decision, if left undisturbed by the Court, might well expand, both to other
courts and to other groups.
On this point it is useful to recall two facts. First, Justice White, channeling Justice Rehnquist’s concern about the Fifth Circuit’s bestowal of
heightened scrutiny, noted in his June 6 letter to Justice Powell the fact that
the appellate court’s suspect class decision, if not rejected, would govern
district court cases from that circuit.192 Second, the lower courts in
Cleburne concluded that federal courts had disagreed on the question of the
scrutiny status required for intellectual disability.193 Combined, these observations focus our attention on what might have concerned Justice
Rehnquist and his like-minded colleagues: the possibility that failure to address the suspect class issue would, in White’s words, “leave in place an
189

190
191
192
193

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text (noting
Rehnquist’s insistence that the rational basis test remain deferential and the consequences of that
position). This move cannot be explained by suggesting that Rehnquist in fact agreed with the
idea of heightened scrutiny for sex classifications. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450
U.S. 464, 468 (1981) (plurality opinion) (Rehnquist, J.) (refusing to acknowledge that previous
cases, including Craig itself, had instituted tougher-than-normal scrutiny of sex classifications,
and focusing instead on the Court’s rejection of strict scrutiny in Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677).
The Court in Craig did not explicitly state that it was instituting an intermediate scrutiny level.
See Eyer, supra note 80.
Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from White, J. to Powell, J. (June 6, 1985).
See Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 196 n.7 (5th Cir. 1984) (listing
cases in which federal courts had come to varied opinions on the level of scrutiny question);
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. v. City of Cleburne, No. CA3-80-1576-F, slip op. at 18–19 (N.D. Tex.,
Dallas Div. 1982) (same).
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erroneous Fifth Circuit precedent”194 that, if left undisturbed by the Court,
might also tip the balance in other lower courts considering the same issue.
When combined with the Court’s liberals’ continued call for expanding
the list of suspect classes,195 one might understand how the more conservative Justices understood the relative stakes of the two questions posed in
Cleburne. In contrast to his focus on the suspect class issue, Rehnquist’s
dismissive description of Cleburne’s character as a rational basis decision—“one of five or six hundred decisions of this Court applying rational
basis equal protection analysis to a particular ordinance”—suggests his lack
of concern about that part of the opinion.196 The irony of that dismissiveness will not be lost on anyone who knows the important role that aspect of
the opinion has played in the evolution of the Court’s subsequent equal
protection doctrine.197
Of course, identifying Justice Rehnquist’s motives involves, at best, informed speculation. Without indulging further in such speculation, what
Cleburne suggests is that when a case presents multiple issues, a Justice’s
decision to focus on one issue (such as Rehnquist’s focus on the suspect
class question) may influence those other results in ways that are quite unintended. Moving beyond the role played by Justice Rehnquist, this dynamic highlights the imperatives of institutional dynamics—the need to
count to five, in Justice Brennan’s well-known phrasing.198 In Cleburne,
Justice Rehnquist’s willingness to indulge Justice Powell’s insistence that
the Court decide the case rather than remanding—a willingness that appears, at least inferentially, to have been driven by his desire to cement a
majority for the Court’s suspect class analysis—paved the road to the
194
195

196
197
198

Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from White, J. to Powell, J. (June 6, 1985).
See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Brennan’s dissent from the
denial of certiorari in Rowland, 470 U.S. 1009 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting
from the denial of certiorari)). Recall also that in the post-oral argument conferences Justice
Blackmun joined Justices Brennan and Marshall in committing to supporting heightened scrutiny
for the intellectually disabled, and Justice Stevens left open that possibility. See Powell Papers,
supra note 47, Conference Notes (Mar. 20, 1985) (appearing to make the notation, “apply
heightened standard” under Justice Blackmun’s name); Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter
from Stevens, J., to White, J. (June 3, 1985) (agreeing that the court of appeals did not need to
apply a “somewhat heightened” standard of scrutiny but expressing willingness to move forward
to the conclusion that the discrimination at issue was unconstitutional).
Letter from Justice Rehnquist to Justice White (June 5, 1985), in Thurgood Marshall Papers, Library of Congress, box 371, file 11.
Cf. supra note 136 (highlighting Powell’s statement that Cleburne’s suspect class analysis “will
be the precedent that counts”).
See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, In Memoriam, William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 HARV. L. REV. 29, 32
(1997) (“Justice Brennan used to joke that a critical talent for a Supreme Court Justice was the
ability to count to five.”). See generally William D. Araiza, Playing Well with Others—But Still
Winning: Chief Justice Roberts, Precedent, and the Possibilities of a Multi-Member Court, 46
GA. L. REV. 1059 (2012) (explaining how institutional dynamics can impact the path of constitutional doctrine).
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Court’s rational basis analysis. It also led to the oddity—criticized by Justice Marshall—of the Court’s “two for the price of one” sequencing of the
issues in that case. Thus, the Court’s multi-member dynamic appears to
have led to results that were subject to objective critique (the Court’s sequencing decision), unintended by some critical, seemingly victorious,
players in that dynamic (the creation of heightened rational basis review),
and, indeed, probably unintended by a majority of the Court.199
B. As-Applied Review/Heightened Rationality Review
Beyond the decision to reach the rational basis issue, the substance of
the Court’s rational basis analysis appears to have been the unintended result of a dispute among the Justices on yet another seemingly distinct issue.
As Part II.B. set forth, once Justice White agreed to expand his opinion by
resolving the case rather than remanding it, he and Justice Powell engaged
in an extended discussion over whether that resolution appropriately entailed a facial strike-down of the Cleburne ordinance or a strike-down as
applied only to the particular group home and its would-be residents. But
unlike their discussion of the remand issue, this dialogue ended with Justice
White successfully holding his position in favor of an as-applied, rather
than a facial, strike-down.
Beyond generally accepting the majority position that facial strikedowns were disfavored in comparison to more limited as-applied decisions,200 in June 1985 Justice White was deeply invested in the outcome of
the as-applied/facial question. Pending during his discussions with Justice
Powell was his draft for the Court in Brockett v. Spokane Arcades,201 a First
Amendment case where Justice White, writing for the majority, insisted
that as-applied strike-downs were favored over facial invalidations.
Spokane Arcades’s subject-matter—the First Amendment—matters to
the facial/as-applied distinction: First Amendment “overbreadth” doctrine
provides the strongest case for deviating from the preference for as-applied
strike downs. First Amendment “overbreadth” analysis contemplates that a
plaintiff whose expression could be validly regulated may nevertheless ar-

199
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Recall that both Justices White and Rehnquist expressed a preference for remanding the case,
and that Justice White, in particular, described that as a course he “much prefer[red].” Powell
Papers, supra note 47, Letter from White, J. to Powell, J. (June 6, 1985).
See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 740, 745 (1987) (majority opinion, joined by White,
J.) (“A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully”). Justice White also wrote an important opinion cautioning against widespread use
of First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610–16
(1973). Overbreadth doctrine, and its relation to the facial/as-applied issue, is explained in the
next paragraph in the text.
472 U.S. 491, 501–02 (1985). Spokane Arcades was handed down on June 19, 1985. Id. at 491.
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gue that others’ expression was unconstitutionally infringed by the law that
ensnared him. The Court’s willingness to allow such a plaintiff to cite the
“chill” the law exerted on others’ speech deviates from its normal preference for deciding whether a given law is valid as applied to that plaintiff—
indeed, the Court has gone so far as to ground that preference in the general
rule that a plaintiff lacks standing to assert the legal rights of third parties.202 Nevertheless, in Spokane Arcades—a First Amendment case—
Justice White insisted that as-applied invalidation of the law at issue was
the appropriate response, because the plaintiffs themselves were the victims
of unconstitutional regulation of their expression.
Thus, Spokane Arcades presented a plausible reason for departing from
First Amendment overbreadth analysis and striking the law down only in
part. Nevertheless, it might still have been seen as odd for Justice White to
have authored two majority opinions in short order, one of them (Spokane
Arcades) insisting that as-applied invalidation was the appropriate course
of action, even in a First Amendment case, and the other (Cleburne) striking down an ordinance on its face.203
Regardless of whether his pending opinion in Spokane Arcades was the
cause, in Cleburne Justice White held fast to the as-applied approach he
initially proposed. In turn, that approach logically required that his analysis
focus on the details of the particular group home that was forced to seek a
special permit and that was then denied that permit. Given that more particularized, factual focus, one can understand why his rational basis analysis explicitly centered on whether record evidence supported the city’s ex-
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See, e.g., Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980) (“Given a
case or controversy, a litigant whose own activities are unprotected [by the First Amendment]
may nevertheless challenge a statute by showing that it substantially abridges the First Amendment rights of other parties not before the court. In these First Amendment contexts, the courts
are inclined to disregard the normal rule against permitting one whose conduct may validly be
prohibited to challenge the proscription as it applies to others because of the possibility that protected speech or associative activities may be inhibited by the overly broad reach of the statute.”)
(citations omitted); Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612 (“[T]he Court has altered its traditional rules of
standing to permit—in the First Amendment area—‘attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity.’”) (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister,
380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100
YALE L.J. 853, 867 (1991) (“The most common account of the First Amendment overbreadth
doctrine justifies a departure from ordinary standing principles in procedural or prophylactic
terms.”).
Indeed, Justice White’s authorship of Broadrick, a case that came to be influential for insisting
that overbreadth challenges be strictly limited even given the unique First Amendment-based
concerns over laws chilling protected speech, suggests the strength of his commitment to a rule
generally preferring as-applied rather than facial invalidations. See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 610–
16.
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planations for its actions.204 After all, if the proper scope of the analysis
was limited to the particular facts of the group home Jan Hannah sought to
establish, one would naturally seek those facts in the record of the litigation
involving her home.
In turn, reliance on that record implies, even if it does not mandate, a
shift in the burden of proof. Even if it is conceivable that a court in an
equal protection case could refer to the record but nevertheless maintain a
heavy thumb on the scale in favor of the government, such a reference nevertheless changes the tone of the Court’s analysis. Quite simply, reference
to the record seems conceptually, if admittedly not ineluctably, inconsistent
with a rational basis doctrine205 that allows a court to embrace completely
speculative, non-record based facts supporting the rationality of the government’s action.206
These characteristics of Cleburne—the insistence on record evidence
supporting the city’s action, the resulting conceptual shift in the burden of
proof, and, more generally, the Court’s more probing tone—all became
hallmarks of that case’s more searching version of rational basis scrutiny.
As explained above, it is plausible to believe that the first of these characteristics—the insistence on record evidence—triggered the latter two. In
turn, that insistence on record evidence may well have flowed unwittingly
from Justice White’s insistence on an as-applied analysis.
Circumstantial evidence for this thesis arises from the flaws in that asapplied analysis. As earlier parts of this Article noted, Justice Powell and
his clerk had long believed that the Cleburne ordinance should be struck
down on its face. After examining the first draft of Justice White’s rational
basis analysis, that clerk remarked that, while she approved of the analysis,
it struck her as supporting a facial, rather than an as-applied, strikedown.207 She concluded that White’s analysis said much about intellectual-
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See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1984) (“Because in our view
the record does not reveal any rational basis for believing that the Featherston home would pose
any special threat to the city’s legitimate interests, we affirm the judgment below insofar as it
holds the ordinance invalid as applied in this case.”); id. at 450 (“At least this record does not
clarify how . . . the characteristics of the intended occupants of the Featherston home rationally
justify denying to those occupants what would be permitted to groups occupying the same site
for different purposes.”); cf. id. at 458 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“The ‘record’ is said not to support the ordinance’s classifications but under the
traditional standard we do not sift through the record to determine whether policy decisions are
squarely supported by a firm factual foundation.”) (quoting majority opinion) (citation omitted).
See, e.g., supra notes 139–140 (citing cases adopting this highly deferential approach, under
which laws can satisfy the rational basis standard without reference to the record).
See supra note 204 (quoting Justice Marshall’s similar critique of the majority opinion’s recourse
to the record).
See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Memorandum from Annmarie Levins to Powell, J. (June 13,
1985).
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ly disabled persons in general as occupants of a neighborhood, but nothing
about the particular would-be residents of the Featherston home.208
That critique, even as slightly corrected,209 implies either that Justice
White was more committed to the idea of as-applied review than its full
application (which would have required a more intensive granular focus on
the particular residents of the Featherston home), or, alternatively or additionally, that a case such as Cleburne posed a vexing problem for the asapplied/facial issue. The first possibility has already been mentioned in the
context of his then-pending decision in Spokane Arcades,210 but its resolution must remain speculative.
As for the second possibility, the evidence tends to support, tentatively,
the hypothesis that Cleburne illustrates the complexity of the asapplied/facial distinction, and the difficulty that distinction poses for judges.211 Consider that evidence. During the aforementioned White-Powell
correspondence about Justice White’s rational basis analysis, White insisted that an as-applied analysis was appropriate because the city might be
justified in requiring a permit for group homes for the intellectually disabled in some circumstances: either when the would-be residents were more
profoundly disabled, or when such persons proposed to live together without supervision.212 Thus, there was a reason for White’s insistence on an
as-applied approach, beyond his mere abstract commitment to that approach (an approach that, to repeat, he was then in the course of defending
and explaining in his Spokane Arcades draft). Nevertheless, the granularity
of his analysis in the letter he sent to Justice Powell defending the asapplied approach was largely absent in the rational basis analysis he expressed in the opinion himself. Justice Powell’s clerk noted this absence—
she remarked that White’s analysis was “quite good,” but “support[ed]
[Justice Powell’s] position for a ‘facial’ challenge better than it support[ed]
[Justice White’s] position for an ‘as-applied’ challenge.”213
208
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Id. In fact, the June 11 draft’s rational basis analysis the clerk was reviewing did contain two
references to the particular characteristics of the intellectually disabled persons who sought to
occupy the Featherston home. See June 11 Draft, supra note 169, at 15 (referring to the “mildly
or moderately mentally retarded individuals who would live at 201 Featherston”); id. at 16 (noting that “[t]hose who would live in the Featherston home are the type of individuals
who . . . satisfy federal [and] state standards for group housing in the community”). Both of these references survived into the final opinion. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449–50.
See supra note 208.
See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
Cf. Powell Papers, supra note 47, Memorandum from Annmarie Levins to Powell, J. (June 13,
1985), at 2 (describing “a somewhat artificial distinction between facial and as applied challenges” in White’s June 11 draft).
See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Powell, J. to White, J. (June 17, 1985).
Powell Papers, supra note 47, Memorandum from Annmarie Levins to Powell, J. (June 13,
1985). Ironically, one point in Justice White’s analysis where he did carefully focus on the dif-
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Evaluating that critique, we should recognize that, had Justice White in
fact suggested that the city might have been justified in denying more profoundly disabled persons the opportunity to occupy the Featherston home,
he would have been indulging in the same type of judicial review of technocratic judgments about the effect of differing degrees of intellectual disability that he had already criticized earlier in his opinion. Recall that in
the prior part of his opinion, dealing with the suspect class issue, he cited
courts’ inability to draw such fine lines as one of the reasons for rejecting
heightened scrutiny for the intellectually disabled as a general matter.214
Had he then suggested, in the next part of his opinion, that courts might endorse the rationality of municipalities’ restrictions on the living arrangements of more profoundly disabled persons, he would essentially have been
calling on lower courts to make those same technocratic judgments.215
Scholars have long debated the concepts of facial and as-applied judicial invalidations of statutes. Some have suggested that the distinction between the two is less bright than it seems, and may reflect underlying substantive doctrine rather than a generally-applicable trans-substantive rule
about the proper scope of judicial strike-downs.216 In this case, there does
seem to exist a basic doctrinal tension at the core of Justice White’s ostensibly as-applied analysis in Cleburne. It seems likely from the communications recounted above that Justice White’s concern for allowing Cleburne
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ferent levels of intellectual disability was in his suspect class analysis. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at
442 (“Nor are [the intellectually disabled] all cut from the same pattern: as the testimony in this
record indicates, they range from those whose disability is not immediately evident to those who
must be constantly cared for.”); id. (referring to the intellectually disabled as a “large and diversified group”) (emphasis added). As noted in the next paragraph of the text, this reference may
have been telling: his anxiety about courts closely scrutinizing differential treatment of the intellectually disabled in light of their differing capacities may have also led him to shrink back from
carefully testing the city’s permit denial against the particular capabilities of the would-be residents of the Featherston home.
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442–43 (“[The intellectually disabled] range from those whose disability is
not immediately evident to those who must be constantly cared for. . . . How this large and diversified group is to be treated under the law is a difficult and often a technical matter, very much a
task for legislators guided by qualified professionals and not by the perhaps ill-informed opinions
of the judiciary.”).
Indeed, one can get a sense of the difficulties courts would encounter in credibly making such
judgments when one reads one of the instances of Justice White himself making just such a
judgment in the course of reviewing the rationality of the city’s action. See Id. at 449 (“If there
is no concern about legal responsibility with respect to other uses that would be permitted in the
area . . . it is difficult to believe that the groups of mildly or moderately mentally retarded individuals who would live at 201 Featherston would present any different or special hazard.”).
See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing,
113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1324 (2000) (“[T]he incidence and success of facial challenges are
not . . . governed by any general formula defining the conditions for successful facial challenges.
Instead, the availability of facial challenges varies on a doctrine-by-doctrine basis and is a function of the applicable substantive tests of constitutional validity.”).
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and other municipalities leeway to limit group homes depending on the severity of the would-be residents’ disabilities led him intuitively to favor an
as-applied approach. That choice, in turn, logically led him to the more
record-intensive review he performed in Cleburne.
Yet at the same time, his seeming hesitancy to rely heavily on the characteristics of the would-be residents of the Featherston home caused his
“as-applied” analysis to take on a more facial tinge: even if Justice Powell’s clerk was not completely correct when she stated that nothing in that
analysis turned on the particular capabilities of the persons who wished to
occupy that home, his analysis remained heavily focused on the intellectually disabled as a group. As noted two paragraphs above, there may have
been good reason for Justice White’s reticence: after all, his suspect class
analysis rested in part on concerns that courts could not competently evaluate the needs and appropriate treatment of different groups of intellectually
disabled persons. Thus, the coherence of Justice White’s as-applied analysis may have been undermined by his own recognition of courts’ difficulty
in making the judgments that analysis required.
Ultimately, whether or not his pending opinion in Spokane Arcades led
Justice White to insist on an as-applied approach, and even whether or not
that approach was internally coherent, matters less than the consequences
of his choice to embrace that approach. As explained above, that choice
led him to refer to the record. In turn, that reference led, logically if not inexorably, to the more muscular tone (and reality) of his analysis. But at the
same time, such as-applied analysis did not reach full flower, perhaps because of White’s caution about making the very judgments he cautioned
courts against trying to make. Thus, his rational basis analysis took on a
more facial tone, but retained the reference to the record that implied to
readers that something more muscular than traditional rational basis review
was afoot. As we know, that tone reverberated far beyond that case.217
IV. LESSONS FROM A POSSIBLE ACCIDENT
It is interesting in itself that the Cleburne opinion we know may have
resulted, at least in part, from the unintended dynamics of the Justices’ interactions, or from their interest in other issues that collaterally, but crucially, affected Cleburne itself. Cleburne is an important case that has significantly influenced the evolution of the Court’s constitutional doctrine.
Realizing that it may have been even partially, or possibly, an “accident”
adds to our understanding of our constitutional history.
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See supra note 12 (describing the aftermath of Cleburne).
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But this insight matters also for what it might tell us more generally
about the Court, the legal doctrines that emanate from it, and the public’s
understanding of those doctrines. A striking aspect of Cleburne is that, for
generalists and non-lawyers, the story it tells is a coherent one. On this understanding of the case, the Court began by considering whether the intellectually disabled merited explicitly heightened scrutiny. After finding at
least some support for that argument but nevertheless rejecting it, it then
(logically, on this telling) considered whether the city’s action was so irrational or infected with animus as to fail rational basis scrutiny. As one
might expect on this telling, it conducted that search with the more careful
eye warranted by the evidence it uncovered during its suspect class inquiry.
In this more lay understanding of the case, the Court’s sequencing of its
analysis did not constitute the illogical or (as Justice Marshall charged) illegitimate deciding of constitutional questions unnecessary to the resolution of the case. Instead, that sequencing made complete sense.218
The force of this narrative is buttressed by the reasons the Court gave
for rejecting the intellectually disabled’s claim to explicitly heightened protection. As is well known, the majority’s analysis of the suspect class question was suffused by anxiety about the Court’s proper role. It expressed
concern that courts could not easily distinguish between benign differentiation and invidious mistreatment of the intellectually disabled.219 It also
worried that intrusive judicial review would dissuade states from treating
the intellectually disabled differently, even when that differential treatment
was benign, for example, as with special education.220 More generally, it
noted the difficult medical and social science issues surrounding the entire
area, and expressed concern that courts lacked the competence to secondguess such treatment.221 And, in a final statement of anxiety about the argument for suspect class status, the Court wondered how, if it granted that
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Indeed, this sequencing appears to have made sense to specialists as well. See, e.g., Phan v. Virginia, 806 F.2d 516, 521 n.6 (4th Cir. 1986) (characterizing Justice Marshall’s dissent as, in turn,
describing the majority’s “second order rational basis” analysis in Cleburne as “occur[ring] in
cases in which the law in question approaches, but falls short, of the . . . suspect classifications
usually triggering strict scrutiny”); cf. Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With
Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 41–46 (2010) (discussing the concept of “acoustic separation,” in which the Court speaks to elites and the general public in ways
that convey different messages to the two groups).
See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442–46 (acknowledging the existence of discrimination against the
intellectually disabled, but refusing to “subject all government action based on that classification” to a higher scrutiny merely due to the chance that the action rises above simple differentiation).
See id. at 444–45.
See id. at 442–43 (describing the treatment under the law of the intellectually disabled as a
“technical matter,” involving myriad medical distinctions, which the legislature, “guided by qualified professionals,” is better-equipped to address than the “perhaps ill-informed . . . judiciary”).
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status to the intellectually disabled, it could legitimately deny it to a bevy
of other groups who could claim an analogous history of mistreatment and
current social subordination.222
All told, these anxieties do more than buttress the Court’s decision on
the suspect class issue. They also reinforce the plausibility of a narrative in
which insurmountable practical and jurisprudential obstacles prevented the
Court from granting the intellectually disabled suspect class status as a
general matter, but which nevertheless gave the Court reason to worry
about that group’s vulnerability to majoritarian oppression. In this narrative, the Court addressed that vulnerability through the heightened, but
more granular, review it performed under the aegis of the rational basis
standard.
But that (plausible) story is not the one told by the Justices’ papers.
Their papers instead reflect a divided Court, a bloc of which was deeply interested in rejecting the appellate court’s suspect class analysis, and which
was willing to compromise on rational basis analysis in order to secure a
majority for their more intensely desired result. The contrast between this
history—the real story of Cleburne—and its possible readings by persons
outside the Court reminds us that court opinions, like any text, can take on
meanings of their own, as readers impose their own assumptions, understandings, and order on the content.
This is as well-known an idea in law as it is in literature.223 In both
fields, theories of interpretation insist that it is the text that matters, not the
intentions of the authors who wrote (or, in the case of opinions, Justices
who joined) that text.224 (To be sure, these theories are not unquestioned;
indeed, even adherents to such theories might maintain that, while text is in
fact what matters, evidence of the authors’ intentions can help elucidate
that textual meaning.)225 In the case of Cleburne, that text tells a seemingly
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See id. at 445–46 (illustrating the difficulty in distinguishing between prejudice or discrimination
suffered by the intellectually disabled and, say, the physically disabled or elderly).
See, e.g., T.S. ELIOT, THE SACRED WOOD AND MAJOR EARLY ESSAYS 30 (1998) (“Honest criticism and sensitive appreciation is directed not upon the poet but upon the poetry.”).
See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 6, at 473 (“Lawyers and historians agree that almost everything we
need to know about constitutional law is found in the Supreme Court’s published opinions. Internal Court documents, like Justice Thurgood Marshall’s papers, tell us something about the dynamics within the Court but relatively little about constitutional law.”). To be sure, it is possible
to argue that the meaning of those opinions—that is, the law that emanates from them—can or
should be derived in part by investigation of the Court’s internal papers, in a way analogous to
the use of legislative history to determine the meaning of a statutory text. For a thorough consideration of this possibility, see Adrian Vermeule, Judicial History, 108 YALE L.J. 1311 (1999).
See, e.g., Vermeule, supra note 224 (concluding that, while understandably excluded on structural and institutional grounds, internal “judicial history” could still prove valuable for interpretive
purposes); cf. E. D. HIRSCH, JR., VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION 17 (1967) (claiming the “obvious
fact” that a reader can never know an author’s subjective intentions “should not be allowed to
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coherent story about the Justices applying one approach (suspect class
analysis), and then, when that approach did not satisfactorily dispose of the
case, turning to another (heightened rationality review). Indeed, it does so
in a context where the Court recognizes the force of the plaintiffs’ argument for suspect class status, finds itself unable to accept that argument,
but ends up not only ruling for the plaintiffs, but doing so in a way that
honors that first argument’s core concern with protecting sociallysubordinated groups. That story may have been an “accident,” as this Article has defined that term (that is, as a consequence that was not intended by
a majority of the Justices). But it had effect nonetheless.
If all this is true, then judicial doctrine may be more random than we
think. If the need to garner majority support for all aspects of an opinion
leads the authoring Justice to bob and weave—essentially, to logroll—so as
to cobble together a majority coalition, then those maneuvers may combine
to create a product that lacks full majority support for any of its components.226 Moreover, when the resulting opinion tells a seemingly coherent
story—as the Cleburne opinion does—the distortion of the law may be
even greater. In other words, when the components of an opinion combine
to tell such a story, then the text as a whole may carry even more communicative content than the sum of its parts—even when that content, and indeed, even those component parts, lack active majority support. To the extent that underlying narrative is embraced by influential consumers of the
Court’s work-product—for example, by professors who strive to harmonize
a set of cases into a coherent, understandable doctrine for their students—
the distortion is carried forward and threatens to become “the law” those
cases “stand for.”
To be sure, this may not be the full story of Cleburne. The fact remains
that there was majority support for Justice White’s rejection of suspect
class status for the intellectually disabled—at least eventually, when Justice
Powell finally came around to recognizing the importance of a statement
from the Court on that issue.227 But the application of more muscular rational basis review does appear to have been an afterthought—not just an
afterthought to Justice White, who was prevailed upon to draft that final
section of the opinion only on the insistence of Justice Powell, but also an
afterthought to both Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor, who appeared to
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sanction the overly hasty conclusion that the author’s intended meaning is inaccessible and is
therefore a useless object of interpretation”).
As two scholars defined it, “logrolling” refers to the practice of “combining of unpopular proposals into one omnibus initiative that will command majority support.” Robert D. Cooter &
Michael D. Gilbert, Reply to Hasen and Matsusaka, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 59, 60 (2010).
See Powell Papers, supra note 47, Letter from Powell, J. to White, J. (June 7, 1985); id., Letter
from Powell, J. to Brennan, J. (June 10, 1985).
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prioritize ensuring that the Court remained committed to the initial draft’s
suspect class analysis.228
The muscular character of that rational basis review itself may also
have been not fully intended. Instead, it may have flowed in part from Justice White’s insistence on invalidating the city’s action as-applied, rather
than facially—an insistence that may have led him to rely on the record,
which in turn suggested to readers that something more than traditional rational basis review was afoot. If White’s insistence on as-applied review
flowed from the impending release of his opinion in Spokane Arcades, then
we are left to conclude that the happenstance of his other writing assignment ultimately influenced his tone in Cleburne. The other explanation for
his insistence—his desire to allow governments maximum leeway to regulate the living situations of more profoundly disabled persons—presents an
even bigger irony. As noted earlier, if the as-applied nature of his analysis
pushed him to refer to the record, then his desire to provide government
with more, not less, room to regulate resulted, ironically, in the more stringent tone of his rational basis analysis.229
These indicia of accidentalness matter, especially from the vantage
point of 2017, when Cleburne has come to be understood not just as the
death knell for suspect class analysis at the Court, but also as a milestone in
heightened rational basis review.
Today, such review is wellacknowledged by the lower courts and by commentators, if not by the
Court itself230 (even if the Court still performs it). Cleburne really did
point the way toward that new approach to equal protection. But in pointing toward that direction, the Court may simply have been shooing away a
fly. In other words, the overall impact of the Cleburne opinion may constitute the biggest accident of all.
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It bears repeating that both Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor reaffirmed their joins of Justice
White’s opinion very quickly after White circulated the new part of his opinion applying rational
basis analysis. See supra note 137.
Indeed, as noted earlier, the irony is compounded by the fact that Justice White could not fully
perform that as-applied analysis, since it would have required him to engage in the judicial linedrawing between different levels of disability that he had abjured in his suspect class analysis.
See supra note 214 and accompanying text. But see supra note 208 (identifying parts of White’s
opinion that did note the particular degree of disability experienced by the would-be residents of
the Featherston home).
But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579–80 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (describing the rational basis review performed in Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer as “more
searching”).

